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I’m the commander—see, I don’t need to explain—I do not 
need to explain why I say things. That’s the interesting thing 
about being the president. Maybe somebody needs to explain to 
me why they say something, but I don’t feel like I owe anybody 
an explanation. 
—George W. Bush1 
  INTRODUCTION   
If Americans know one thing about their system of gov-
ernment, it is that they live in a democracy and that other, less 
fortunate people, live in dictatorships. Dictatorships are what 
democracies are not, the very opposite of representative gov-
ernment under a constitution.2 
The opposition between democracy and dictatorship, how-
ever, is greatly overstated.3 The term “dictatorship,” after all, 
began as a special constitutional office of the Roman Republic, 
granting a single person extraordinary emergency powers for a 
limited period of time.4 “Every man the least conversant in 
Roman story,” remarked Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist 
No. 70, “knows how often that republic was obliged to take ref-
uge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable 
title of Dictator” to confront emergencies caused by insurrec-
 
 1. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 145–46 (2002). Bush famously desig-
nated himself “the decider” in 2006, when asked why he was retaining Donald 
Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in spite of increasing calls, some from re-
tired military officers, for Rumsfeld’s dismissal. “I hear the voices, and I read 
the front page, and I know the speculation. But I’m the decider, and I decide 
what is best.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Decider, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, at 
4. Bush waited until after the 2006 elections to remove Rumsfeld. See Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg & Jim Rutenberg, Rumsfeld Resigns; Bush Vows ‘To Find Com-
mon Ground’; Focus Is on Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A1. 
 2. Cf. Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Lat-
in America, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2006) (noting the constitutional differences 
between dictatorships and democracy). 
 3. Cf. J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1678–82 
(1990) (book review) (explaining how legal and political ideas and institutions 
that appear to be opposed, on further investigation, depend on or include ele-
ments of each other). 
 4. See ANDREW WILLIAM LINTOTT, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN 
REPUBLIC 110 (1999). 
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tion, sedition, and external enemies.5 No political constitution 
was well designed, Hamilton believed, unless it could confront 
emergencies and provide for energetic executive powers to han-
dle them.6 
Under this view, dictatorship—the power of government of-
ficials to act on important matters free of accountability or 
timely legal checks—is not the opposite of democracy—or what 
our Constitution calls a “Republican Form of Government.”7 It 
is an institutional feature within constitutional democracies 
that can and should be employed to perform valuable civic 
functions. From this perspective, “dictatorship” becomes—as it 
was in the early Roman Republic—a term of description rather 
than a term of opprobrium.8 It refers to institutions and powers 
of emergency government that constitution makers might es-
tablish to serve the public interest. Indeed, if the institutions 
are properly designed, “dictatorship” might even have positive 
connotations—think only of the praise heaped on the legendary 
Cincinnatus.9 
 
 5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). Hamilton’s point was that Rome did not lose its 
“republican” character because it used dictatorships in emergencies. Id. 
 6. Id. Hamilton, who believed in a strong executive, nevertheless re-
frained from overtly endorsing any sort of “dictatorship” for the United States; 
this political caution was sound, given that the aim of The Federalist Papers 
was to gain the votes of wavering Anti-Federalists in New York, who feared 
concentration of powers (and possibly tyranny) in the new federal government. 
See DAN T. COENEN, THE STORY OF THE FEDERALIST: HOW HAMILTON AND 
MADISON RECONCEIVED AMERICA 3–5 (2007). The New York Convention’s vote 
was 30 to 27, “so a switch of two votes might well have doomed the 1787 pro-
posal or, at the least, required a new convention.” PAUL BREST ET AL., 
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 23 (5th ed. 2006); see also 
Cecil L. Eubanks, New York: Federalism and the Political Economy of Union, 
in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 300, 300 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael 
Lienesch eds., 1989) (same).  
 7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  
 8. See LINTOTT, supra note 4, at 110.  
 9. Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus was a famous Roman statesman whom 
the Senate called from his plow to become dictator and rescue the country 
from invasion. Sixteen days later, after saving the Republic, he promptly re-
signed his dictatorship and returned to his plow. See 1 TITUS LIVIUS (LIVY), 
THE HISTORY OF ROME 170–73 (Ernest Rhys ed., Canon Roberts trans., E.P. 
Dutton & Co. 1912). Cincinnatus was viewed as an exemplar of republican vir-
tue both for his willingness to abandon his family and property to serve the 
Republic and for his decision to give up absolute power and return to life as a 
farmer. See GARRY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE EN-
LIGHTENMENT 20 (1984). Because of his decisions to retire from the Continen-
tal Army and the presidency and return to his farm at Mount Vernon, George 
Washington was called the American Cincinnatus. See JOHN SHELTON LAW-
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At the same time, the Framers of the American Constitu-
tion believed that democracies were dangerous precisely be-
cause they might lead to what they called “tyranny”10—the sort 
of denials of liberty that people today now routinely associate 
with “dictatorship.” Even as they celebrated republicanism—
rule by the people—they distrusted the passions of majorities.11 
For the Framers, democracy was not the antithesis of dictator-
ship, either as a logical or an empirical matter. Democracy was 
a force that always had to be checked, and its passions cooled, 
in order to realize the benefits of republican government. 
Every republic known to the Framers—many of whom 
were steeped in ancient history12—had eventually broken down 
and led to government by a strongman such as Julius Caesar. 
The lesson of the past seemed to be that the natural progres-
 
RENCE & ROBERT JEWETT, THE MYTH OF THE AMERICAN SUPERHERO 130 
(2002) (comparing Washington and Cincinnatus); WILLS, supra, at 23.  
 10. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 336 
(“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the 
same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
 11. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 
AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 4 (1948) (describing complaints about democracy 
by delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, including Edmund Randolph, El-
bridge Gerry, Roger Sherman, and William Livingston); GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 165–67 (1972) (not-
ing that concerns about the excesses of democracy in state governments led to 
calls for a new constitutional convention).  
The Federalist Papers are full of warnings about the passions of majori-
ties. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 130, 
134 (denouncing dangers of “faction,” defined as “a majority or a minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, 
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community,” as well as noting that majority factions 
are more dangerous than minorities); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madis-
on), supra note 5, at 358 (“If a majority be united by a common interest, the 
rights of the minority will be insecure.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Mad-
ison), supra note 5, at 415 (“[T]he people, stimulated by some irregular pas-
sion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of 
interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards 
be the most ready to lament and condemn.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alex-
ander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 459 (“When . . . the interests of the people 
are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they 
have appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the tempo-
rary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and 
sedate reflection.”). 
 12. See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: PREVAILING WISDOM 1 (2008) (“Classical antiquity 
molded the legal expectations of the Framers of the American Constitu-
tion . . . .”); M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 22 (1994) (“[T]he basic framework of their 
education and understanding was classical . . . .”).  
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sion of popular governments was toward demagoguery and 
eventually tyranny; the most obvious example to the founding 
generation was the ill-fated English Revolution in 1640 and the 
rise of Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector.13 Therefore, it was 
crucial to build institutional features like the separation of 
powers and checks and balances to keep America’s experiment 
with republican government safe from the same fate as pre-
vious attempts. 
It is better to think of dictatorship, then, neither with as-
sociations of praise (Cincinnatus) or dread (Hitler), but with a 
necessary ambivalence. It is an institutional framework for 
emergency government that may be valuable and even neces-
sary to constitutional republics; nevertheless, it contains troub-
lesome tendencies that, if allowed to develop unchecked, pose 
serious threats to democratic government.14 
Emergency powers may well be necessary to effective gov-
ernance in a modern state. But precisely because of the growth 
of emergency powers and other forms of executive discretion in 
American legal institutions—not to mention the unhappy fate 
of many other republics—one cannot be sure that the some-
 
 13. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, GOD’S ENGLISHMAN: OLIVER CROMWELL AND 
THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 147–72 (1970) (describing the history of Cromwell’s 
dictatorship as Lord Protector).  
 14. Recently Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have cast scorn on what 
they call “tyrannophobia”—the fear that the expansion of executive power in 
America will lead to dictatorship. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Ty-
rannophobia 1 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 276, 2009), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473858. “[T]he Unit-
ed States,” Posner and Vermeule confidently inform us, “has never had a true 
dictator, or even come close to having one . . . . By now, 233 years after inde-
pendence, these risks should be close to zero.” Id.  
As we explain in this article, Posner and Vermeule gloss over many im-
portant features of American history. One assumes they would respond that 
none of the examples we offer constitute “true” dictatorship; but excluding 
them from one’s stipulated definition does not prove that they pose no dangers 
for either civil liberties or republican government. 
Even putting definitional quibbles aside, we think the claim that after 233 
years America is guaranteed to be “dictator-proof” is entirely too sanguine. It 
is worth noting that the Roman Republic lasted some 460 years, from the ex-
pulsion of the monarchy in approximately 509 B.C., see CLINTON L. ROSSITER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMO-
CRACIES 17 (1948), until Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C., leading 
to civil war and the ultimate dissolution of the Republic. See MATTHIAS GELZ-
ER, CAESAR: POLITICIAN AND STATESMAN 336 (Peter Needham trans., 1968). A 
Roman surveying the scene 233 years after the Roman Kings (some ten years 
after the Lex Hortensia settled the Conflict of the Orders between plebians and 
patricians) might also have confidently predicted a zero percent chance of ei-
ther tyranny or Empire, but would also have been sadly mistaken. 
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times haphazard expansion of executive discretion and emer-
gency power pose no dangers to the United States. We have no 
reason to think that Americans possess a special immunity 
from the pathologies that have befallen many other countries.15 
Above all, we should not leave these developments to chance, or 
assume that the probabilities of things going wrong are nil. If 
emergency government is necessary, its institutions—and the 
restraints upon them—should be the subjects of systematic 
“reflection and choice,”16 designed to preserve and adapt repub-
lican government through the many crises that democracies in-
evitably face. 
In his 1948 book Constitutional Dictatorship, Clinton Ros-
siter surveyed the growth of emergency power in America and 
other western democracies. “That constitutional dictatorship 
does have a future in the United States,” he concluded, “is 
hardly a matter for discussion.”17 Rossiter wrote in the after-
math of World War II, at the very beginning of the National 
Security State. We now have sixty years of additional evidence 
to assess his conclusions, including the explosion of national in-
telligence services and our government’s response to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the 2008 economic crisis.18 Unless, we can 
reject Rossiter’s analysis out of hand, we must pay careful at-
tention to how such systems of emergency governance work. 
We must also consider how best to design them to prevent their 
degeneration and abuse, possibilities of which the founding 
generation was altogether too aware. 
Part I of this Article describes the concept of a “constitu-
tional dictatorship,” its differences from other forms of dictator-
ship, and the important debates about constitutional dictator-
ship that occurred in the middle of the twentieth century. Part 
II identifies elements of constitutional dictatorship in the Ameri-
can system of government, especially in the modern American 
presidency following the creation of the National Security State 
 
 15. For a survey of how emergency powers have spread and become routi-
nized in many different countries, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Exceptions That 
Prove the Rule: Embedding Emergency Government in Everyday Constitutional 
Life, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Ste-
phen Macedo eds., forthcoming 2010). See also OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ 
AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 171–244 (2006) (providing numerous examples).  
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 89. 
 17. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 306.  
 18. See Scheppele, supra note 15. 
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in the 1940s.19 Part III explains the practice of governing 
through emergency, and the temptations to the politics of 
emergency that modern presidents now face. Finally, Part IV 
describes how we might redesign the constitutional system to 
counteract worrisome tendencies in the American presidency 
and head off the dangers of constitutional dictatorship while re-
taining the benefits of a government that effectively handles 
emergencies. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP AND REPUBLICAN 
GOVERNMENT   
A.  IS CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP AN OXYMORON? 
For many people, “constitutional dictatorship” is a contra-
diction in terms. “The very phrase,” Yale political theorist Fred-
rick Watkins wrote in an important 1940 article, The Problem 
of Constitutional Dictatorship, “has a discouragingly paradoxical 
ring.”20 The phrase seems to combine “absolutism,”⎯a govern-
ment devoid of restraints⎯with constitutionalism, “a system of 
government whereby rulers are subjected to the restraining in-
fluence of law.”21 “In the strictest possible sense,” Watkins sug-
gested, “the two words are antithetical.”22 Constitutionalism 
ensures both legitimate leadership and substantive limits on 
what the leader can do, whereas “dictatorship” seems dicey on 
both counts.  
Watkins wrote at the outset of the Second World War—a 
war that seemed on the surface to be one between constitution-
al democracies and dictatorships. Yet Adolf Hitler rose to power 
through skillful use of the constitutional procedures set out in 
 
 19. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (2010). Wills builds on arguments going back 
to Harold D. Lasswell’s seminal article, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. SOC. 
455, 455 (1941) (describing states in which “specialists in violence” are the 
most powerful group in society). 
 20. Frederick M. Watkins, The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship, in 
PUBLIC POLICY 324, 324 (C.J. Friedrich & Edward S. Mason eds., 1940). Be-
cause Watkins’s long article has almost no footnotes, it is hard to gauge how 
much he was influenced by similar discussions in Europe, but one suspects 
that Watkins was well aware given that the year before, in 1939, he published 
a book on emergency powers in Germany. See FREDERICK MUNDELL WATKINS, 
THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE GERMAN 
REPUBLIC (1939).  
 21. Watkins, supra note 20, at 324.  
 22. Id. 
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the Weimar Constitution;23 the Russian dictator, Josef Stalin, 
presided over a “socialist republic” with an elaborate constitu-
tion drafted in 1936.24 Meanwhile, in the liberal democracy of 
Great Britain, Winston Churchill would replace Neville Cham-
berlain as Prime Minister in May of 1940, and Britain’s politi-
cal parties would agree to suspend the (unwritten) constitu-
tional norms of parliamentary elections until the end of the 
war.25 Although still officially a democracy, there was no elec-
tion in Great Britain between 1935 and 1945.26 Thus, Watkins 
did not believe in a sharp dichotomy between “democracy” and 
“dictatorship.”27 For him the term “constitutional dictatorship” 
was not a paradox; it was a fact of life. 
Watkins’s article appeared in 1940 following several tu-
multuous decades in which constitutional governments regular-
ly assumed extraordinary powers to deal with emergencies.28 
At the same time, the development of the modern administra-
tive state in the West was rapidly calling into question many 
traditional assumptions about the rule of law.29 Governments 
increasingly delegated wide-ranging discretionary power over 
important aspects of people’s lives to administrative agencies 
and bureaucrats. Thus, the problem of constitutional dictator-
ship was not the presence of dictatorial elements within consti-
tutional forms of government; these elements had become 
commonplace and, by the end of the 1930s, seemed almost in-
evitable. Rather, the problem—and the challenge—of constitu-
tional dictatorship was to design structures adequate to fore-
stall the dangerous tendencies of dictatorial powers when the 
occasion called for them.30 
 
 23. See IAN KERSHAW, HITLER 1889–1936: HUBRIS 418 (1998). 
 24. See LEONARD SCHAPIRO, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UN-
ION 410–11 (2d ed. 1971). 
 25. See WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE LAST LION: WINSTON SPENCER 
CHURCHILL: ALONE 1932–1940, at 677–81 (1988).  
 26. See William A. Robson, Post-War Municipal Elections in Great Brit-
ain, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 294, 294 (1947). 
 27. See Watkins, supra note 20, at 324. 
 28. See, e.g., ALONZO L. HAMBY, FOR THE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRACY: 
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE WORLD CRISIS OF THE 1930S (2004). 
 29. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EX-
CEPTION: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW 98–99 (1994) (de-
scribing the challenge posed by the administrative and welfare state to tradi-
tional ways of conceptualizing law). 
 30. Watkins, supra note 20, at 358 (noting difficulties of administering 
effective emergency action). 
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In fact, the idea of a constitutional dictatorship has a long 
history, as long as that of republics themselves. Like almost all 
students of constitutional dictatorship, Watkins admired the 
institution of the dictator in ancient Rome, which he described 
as “perhaps the most strikingly successful of all known systems 
of emergency government.”31 As noted previously, in the Roman 
Republic, “dictatorship” was not a not a term of opprobrium, 
but a special legal form of governance designed to address par-
ticular problems.32 Watkins believed it had helped maintain the 
stability and success of the Roman Republic for centuries.33  
During the 1920s and 1930s, the most important writing 
on dictatorships, constitutional and otherwise, was by Carl 
Schmitt, an important political theorist who also gained lasting 
obloquy as a legal apologist for the Nazi takeover of Germany 
in 1933.34 In Schmitt’s 1921 book, Die Diktatur (which presum-
ably needs no translation), he drew on the distinction, traceable 
to Roman law, between “sovereign” and “commissarial” dicta-
tors.35 A sovereign dictator uses a political crisis to overthrow 
the existing constitutional order and found a new one.36 A 
commissarial dictator, by contrast, is constituted by and given 
power by the existing political order; the dictator exercises 
power temporarily in a crisis in order to save the regime and 
 
 31. Id. at 332.  
 32. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Watkins, supra note 20, at 331. But see NOMI CLAIRE LAZAR, 
STATES OF EMERGENCY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 114 (2009) (presenting a 
more skeptical view of the Roman dictatorship).  
 34. For an introduction to Schmitt’s thought, see, e.g., LAW AS POLITICS: 
CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1998); DAVID 
DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND 
HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997); WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL 
SCHMITT: THE END OF LAW (1999).  
 35. See ANDREAS KALYVAS, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE EX-
TRAORDINARY: MAX WEBER, CARL SCHMITT, AND HANNAH ARENDT 89 (2008) 
(discussing Schmitt’s distinction). 
 36. See id. at 90 (noting that sovereign dictatorship is similar to “the clas-
sic legislator who operates outside the existing legal system” and signifies a 
“break that separates it from the previous system of norms”). The “dictator” 
need not be an individual. Carl Schmitt viewed the Philadelphia Convention of 
1787 as an act of sovereign dictatorship because the delegates sought to 
overthrow the existing regime constituted by the Articles of Confederation and 
replace it with a new constitutional order. Id. at 96; see also 2 BRUCE ACKER-
MAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 49 (1998) (“Illegality was a leitmotif 
at the Convention from first to last.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madi-
son), supra note 5, at 291–92 (defending the presumptive illegality of the Con-
vention by reference to the “crisis” and “exigencies” that justified the delegates 
in going well beyond their mandate).  
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return to the status quo as soon as practicably possible.37 The 
Roman dictatorship, in which the dictator held power for a lim-
ited term, is an example.38 
The commissarial dictator is a constitutional dictator, 
whose powers are constituted by the basic law. The sovereign 
dictator, by contrast, has no obligation to return to the consti-
tutional order; indeed, the sovereign dictator constitutes the le-
gal order. One of Schmitt’s best known works, Political Theolo-
gy, notoriously begins by defining the “sovereign” as the person 
(or institution) who can suspend ordinary legality by declaring 
a “state of exception.”39 
Clinton Rossiter’s brilliant and troubling book, Constitu-
tional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democra-
cies, studied the responses of France, Great Britain, Germany, 
the United States, and ancient Rome to emergencies, real and 
perceived, including those generated by the Great Depression 
and World War II.40 Some of these emergencies involved prob-
lems of national security, and some were economic crises, in-
cluding, of course, economic dislocations generated by war and 
its aftermath. Rossiter concluded that one constant in all the 
examples of emergency government he studied was the decision 
to adopt some form of dictatorship, validly legal or otherwise.41 
Like Watkins, Rossiter emphasized the difference between 
“constitutional” and “unconstitutional” dictatorships, arguing 
strongly in favor of the former.42 Similarly, Carl J. Friedrich, 
one of Harvard’s leading lights in political theory during the 
mid-twentieth century, devoted a full chapter of his well-known 
textbook, Constitutional Government and Democracy, to consid-
eration of “constitutional dictatorship,”43 which he contrasted to 
its more ominous counterpart, “totalitarian dictatorship.”44 
 
 37. See KALYVAS, supra note 35, at 89. 
 38. See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 20–23. 
 39. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CON-
CEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 n.1 (George Schwab trans., 2006); see also GIORGIO 
AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005). 
 40. See generally ROSSITER, supra note 14.  
 41. See id. at 11–14. 
 42. Id. at 3–4. 
 43. See CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOC-
RACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 572–96 (1950). See 
generally C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1957) (discussing development of “constitu-
tional dictatorship”).  
 44. CARL J. FRIEDRICH & ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITARIAN DICTA-
TORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY (1956). Key to understanding the title is the implicit 
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Except for Schmitt, who is (in)famous for other reasons, 
this body of work has not generated much of a legacy, at least 
in the United States. Friedrich and Watkins are largely forgot-
ten, and Rossiter is now probably best known as the editor of 
what is probably the most widely cited edition of The Federalist 
Papers. Some political scientists may still consult his important 
work on the presidency,45 but his far more probing (and dis-
turbing) work on constitutional dictatorship appears to lan-
guish. We believe this is a mistake. The problem of constitu-
tional dictatorship is as important today as it was in ancient 
Rome and the first half of the twentieth century. Although we 
often oppose emergency to normal times, emergency and the 
problems of emergency government are always with us. All the 
more reason then to study the design—and the dangers—of 
constitutional dictatorships. 
B. THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP  
We begin with perhaps the most important theorist of 
“constitutional dictatorship” in the West, the great Florentine 
theorist Niccolo Machiavelli.46 Although Machiavelli is proba-
bly best known for his advice to rulers in The Prince, his work 
on republican theory is far more important to understanding 
dictatorship in constitutional systems. In his Discourses on 
Livy, Machiavelli praised the Romans for constructing a consti-
tutional structure for dictatorships, before these procedures de-
generated and were supplanted by Julius Caesar, the last of 
the (initially) constitutional dictators.47 
 
premise that there are varieties of dictatorship, including “constitutional” and 
“totalitarian” versions. 
 45. See generally CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1956); 
CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 
(1951). 
 46. See Harvey C. Mansfield, Introduction to NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE 
PRINCE, at vii, vii (Harvey C. Mansfield ed., 2d ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1998) 
(1532) (describing Machiavelli’s The Prince as “the most famous book on poli-
tics ever written”). 
 47. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY 95 (Julia Conaway Bon-
danella & Peter Bondanella trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1531). See LA-
ZAR, supra note 33, at 120, for a further discussion of the history of the Roman 
dictatorship, including the role of Julius Caesar in bringing the “constitution-
al” phase of Roman dictatorship to an end. Particularly important to this his-
tory is the reinstitution of the dictatorship after many years of desuetude by 
Lucius Cornelius Sulla. On Sulla’s innovations, see ARTHUR KEAVENEY, SUL-
LA: THE LAST REPUBLICAN 162 (1982) (noting that Sulla held the dictatorship 
without a fixed term limit and enjoyed far broader jurisdiction than previous 
dictators). 
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“Among all the other Roman institutions,” Machiavelli ar-
gued, the dictatorship “truly deserves to be considered and 
numbered among those which were the source of the greatness 
of such an empire, because without a similar system cities sur-
vive extraordinary circumstances only with difficulty.”48 Dicta-
torship was central to Rome’s success because “[t]he usual in-
stitutions in republics are slow to move . . . and, since time is 
wasted in coming to an agreement, the remedies for republics 
are very dangerous when they must find one for a problem that 
cannot wait.”49 When emergency—or the appearance of emer-
gency—strikes, there must be political leadership to recognize 
the situation and make immediate decisions, without fear of 
bureaucratic hindrances, the need for time-consuming attempts 
at consensus building and all the various veto points characteris-
tic of representative government.  
Republics must therefore have among their laws a proce-
dure . . . [that] reserve[s] to a small number of citizens the authority 
to deliberate on matters of urgent need without consulting anyone 
else, if they are in complete agreement. When a republic lacks such a 
procedure, it must necessarily come to ruin.50 
What is the cause of this “ruin”? Machiavelli identifies two 
possibilities. First, republics can come to ruin by stubbornly 
“obeying their own laws” even when these laws prevent meas-
ures necessary to save the country.51 This creates what we have 
elsewhere called a Type Two constitutional crisis—in which po-
litical leaders follow the law (as they understand it) strictly and 
manage to drive the political order over a cliff.52 
Far more commonplace is a Type One constitutional crisis, 
in which political leaders, faced with exigent circumstances, 
publicly announce that they must break the law to save the re-
public.53 Machiavelli identifies this as the second cause of ruin: 
“breaking laws in order to avoid” disastrous consequences.54 
The problem is that if one is willing to break laws in urgent cir-
cumstances, this creates a precedent for breaking them again 
where the urgency is more controversial (or nonexistent); more-
over, it encourages political leaders to retain unconstitutional 
 
 48. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 47, at 95. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 707, 729 (2009). 
 53. Id. at 721. 
 54. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 47, at 95.  
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norms even after the emergency has passed. What start as 
emergency measures may become normalized. 
Ultimately, recourse to suspending the laws eats away at 
the foundations of republican government. That is why, Ma-
chiavelli argues, “in a republic, it is not good for anything to 
happen which requires governing by extraordinary meas-
ures.”55 We must, Machiavelli teaches, be aware of the possibil-
ity of crises and exigent circumstances when we design a con-
stitution, and include ways of responding to emergencies that 
do not require political leaders to choose between Scylla and 
Charybdis: the disaster caused by hyperfidelity to legal con-
straints or the destruction of republican government by re-
course to out-and-out illegality.56 
Contrast Machiavelli’s approach, which locates dictator-
ship squarely within the ground rules of constitutional gov-
ernment, with the thought of John Locke, whose Second Trea-
tise on Government has been central to the American political 
tradition and surely influenced the founding generation.57 The 
central focus of the Second Treatise is a theory of limited gov-
ernment; nevertheless, a crucial part of Locke’s argument was 
a theory of the monarch’s “prerogative” power. According to 
Locke, the king always retained the prerogative power to sus-
pend the law by fiat whenever he thought it in the public inter-
est.58 Locke did not spell out the details of his approach, and he 
did not draw on historical examples of good and bad practices, 
 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 95–96. 
 57. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION 28 (1967) (noting the importance of Locke’s thought to the 
Framers). The most famous ascription of Locke’s influence on American 
thought is surely LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).  
 58. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 204 (Thomas I. 
Cook ed., 1947) (1690). 
This power to act according to discretion for the public good, without 
the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it, is that 
which is called “prerogative”; for since in some governments the law-
making power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, 
and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to execution, and because 
also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for all acci-
dents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such 
laws as will do no harm if they are executed with an inflexible rigour 
on all occasions and upon all persons that may come in their way, 
therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power to do many 
things of choice which the laws do not prescribe. 
Id; see also CLEMENT FATOVIC, OUTSIDE THE LAW: EMERGENCY AND EXECU-
TIVE POWER 37–82 (2009) (surveying various theories of “prerogative” powers 
in British and American political thought).  
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as Machiavelli had done. As a result, Locke’s notion of “prerog-
ative” is far less developed and helpful to anyone interested in 
constitutional design. 
Locke seems relatively sanguine about the King declaring 
the power to suspend the law.59 In contrast, what concerned the 
republican theorist Machiavelli was the rise of an extraconsti-
tutional dictatorship in cases where the constitution lacked a 
procedure for appointing a dictator and ending the dictator’s 
reign.60 The Roman dictatorship had been thoroughly institu-
tionalized; the two consuls had to decide to appoint a dictator, 
and the dictator’s reign would come to an end at a specified 
time.61 Naming a dictator might signal an emergency, but, by 
definition, it did not constitute a “constitutional crisis,” precise-
ly because the Roman constitution provided for the institution. 
Moreover, it wisely separated the institution with the power to 
identify an emergency and call for emergency powers from the 
person who executed those powers, the better to prevent the 
dictator from trying to extend his rule by recharacterizing the 
situation to his advantage. 
Whether the Framers of the Constitution agreed with Ma-
chiavelli in all respects, they certainly agreed that emergencies 
might test the very notion of constitutional fidelity. That, after 
all, was their own experience. In 1775–76, as a result of a “long 
train of abuses”62 by King George III, many of them began a 
seven-year revolutionary war to overthrow British rule in the 
American colonies, culminating in the 1783 Treaty of Paris.63 
In 1781, the former Colonies ratified the Articles of Confedera-
tion as the first constitution of the fledgling nation.64 
 
 59. See LOCKE, supra note 58, at 222–28. 
 60. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 47, at 94–95. 
 61. See, e.g., LIVIUS, supra note 9, at 170–73. That is, until Sulla’s ascen-
sion in 82 B.C., which gave the dictator the ability to serve as long as he be-
lieved the crisis was ongoing. See KEAVENEY, supra note 47, at 162. Sulla, a 
conservative, resigned the dictatorship within a year’s time, consistent with 
republican ideals. Id. at 162–64. Julius Caesar is said to have mocked Sulla’s 
decision to willingly give up power. See C. SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, THE 
LIVES OF THE TWELVE CAESARS 57 (Maurice Filler ed., Alexander Thomson 
trans., Corner House Publishers 1978) (1882).  
 62. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), re-
printed in THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION AND DECLARATION OF INDE-
PENDENCE 79 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2009).  
 63. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. 
 64. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, available at http://avalon.law 
.yale.edu/18th_century/artconf.asp. 
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The Articles soon proved ineffective, leading to new crises. 
Faced with financial disarray, the dangers of foreign interfer-
ence with the fledgling republic, and the recent memory of 
Shay’s Rebellion, the delegates to the 1787 Philadelphia Con-
vention disregarded the limited mandate given them by Con-
gress to “revise” the Articles and ignored Article XIII’s re-
quirement that any amendment must receive unanimous 
assent of the state legislatures.65 Instead, the delegates wrote a 
brand new constitution that became valid when ratified by con-
ventions in only nine states.66 They refused to be bound by 
what Madison in The Federalist No. 40 called “ill-timed 
scruples” or “zeal for adhering to ordinary forms.”67 Madison 
did not try to portray the Convention as a model of scrupulous 
legal fidelity. Instead, Madison argued that if Americans rati-
fied the proposed Constitution they would “blot out antecedent 
errors and irregularities.”68  
Like many of the other delegates to the Philadelphia Con-
vention, Madison had no interest in retaining the Articles of 
Confederation if it meant a Type Two crisis—political disaster 
from sticking to an ineffective constitution. Far better to pro-
voke a Type One crisis by admitting that one was willing to vi-
olate legal proprieties in the name of the public interest and 
seek public approval for having done so. In The Federalist No. 
41, Madison added the bracing assertion that mere “constitu-
tional barriers” cannot deter “the impulse of self-
preservation.”69 Trying to erect such barriers would simply 
“plant[] . . . in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of 
power.”70  
 
 65. See BREST ET AL., supra note 6, at 19–22. 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. VII.  
 67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 292. 
 68. Id.  
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 295. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). We can better understand Madison’s dismissal 
of a Bill of Rights as mere “parchment barriers” in this light. See THE FED-
ERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 343. 
Walter F. Murphy argues that Madison and Hamilton “strongly disagreed 
with Machiavelli” about the possibility of spelling out procedures to follow in 
times of emergencies. WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: 
CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 308 (2007). Thus, in 
addition to Madison’s remarks in The Federalist No. 41, Murphy adds Hamil-
ton’s statement from The Federalist No. 23 that the national powers “ought to 
exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent 
and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.” Id. Murphy 
may be exaggerating the differences between these authors in order to make a 
point about the importance of discretion in constitutional government. Ma-
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Machiavelli, Locke, Madison, and Schmitt are engaged in a 
common conversation about how governments can adapt to 
crises. None of these thinkers believed in quiescence, and each 
of them discussed, in different ways, the propriety of dictatorial 
action in response to crisis. Ironically, it is Machiavelli who 
comes out most strongly for the rule of law: he argues that con-
stitutional designers can and should prepare for dictatorships 
through regular procedures.71 Locke, by contrast, seems to rely 
principally on the good faith of the monarch and offers no ser-
ious institutional discussion at all.72 Locke does famously sug-
gest that if the public believes that the monarch has abused his 
prerogative powers they can “appeal to heaven” and overthrow 
the government or king.73 This, however, is not an argument of 
constitutional design; rather, it is an invitation to meet one ex-
ample of law breaking with another one. Indeed, that is what 
happened both in 1776, when the Americans appealed to hea-
ven and threw off the British Crown, and in 1787, when the 
Philadelphia Convention abruptly discarded the political sys-
tem established by the Articles of Confederation. Carl Schmitt 
offers perhaps the most chilling analysis of all. Although he rec-
ognizes the possibility of commissarial dictatorships, where the 
ultimate goal of dictatorship is restoring the status quo, he as-
sumes that elements of the sovereign dictatorship always lurk 
in the background, waiting to emerge and to transform any ex-
isting political order.74 No matter how well designed a constitu-
tional system might be, the true sovereign will always be able 
 
chiavelli wanted emergency power to be exercised within constitutional struc-
tures. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 47, at 95. So did Madison and Hamilton. 
Madison’s and Hamilton’s statements in The Federalist Papers cannot mean 
that they were opposed to channeling power through wise institutional design, 
even in emergencies; otherwise it would be hard to explain the basic argument 
of The Federalist Papers, which calls for checking and balancing political pow-
er in order to prevent factions and the passions of majorities from destroying 
republican government. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra 
note 5, at 355. The fact that emergencies cannot be foreseen and that people 
will act out of self-preservation does not mean that any constitutional design 
is as good as any other or avoids the dangers of demagoguery or tyranny 
equally well.  
 71. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 47, at 94–95. 
 72. See LOCKE, supra note 58, at 204. 
 73. Id. at 207 (“[T]he people have no other remedy in this, as in all other 
cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven; for the ru-
lers, in such attempts, exercising a power the people never put into their 
hands—who can never be supposed to consent that anybody should rule over 
them for their harm—do that which they have not a right to do.”). 
 74. See KALYVAS, supra note 35, at 90–92, 97. 
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to escape the confines of that design and make exceptions to it.  
C. WHAT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP? 
We might define a constitutional dictatorship as a system 
(or subsystem) of constitutional government that bestows on 
certain individuals or institutions the right to make binding 
rules, directives, and decisions and apply them to concrete cir-
cumstances, unhindered by timely legal checks to their auth-
ority.75 When they act according to this right, they act clothed 
with all of the authority of the state. These persons or institu-
tions, however, are subject to various procedural and substan-
tive limitations that are set forth in advance. These may in-
clude the time and/or circumstances in which they may exercise 
authority, the subjects over which they may exercise their au-
thority, and specific means for implementing their decisions. 
By “timely” legal checks to authority, we mean procedures 
that allow aggrieved persons to commence actions relatively 
quickly to hold decisionmakers accountable for violations of 
law, even if the controversy is not resolved for some time. For 
example, assuming Congress has not suspended the writ of ha-
beas corpus, prisoners can immediately bring actions in court 
challenging their detention, even if the final decision on the pe-
tition may come years later. With respect to these issues of per-
sonal liberty, therefore, the President has not been empowered 
to act as a dictator. On the other hand, if Congress has sus-
pended the writ due to emergency, this gives the President a 
dictatorial power to detain people without charges or a hearing; 
and courts may not hear habeas actions on the merits until the 
suspension has been lifted.76 Even if prisoners can file habeas 
petitions during the period of the suspension, the courts will 
refuse to consider them. Once the writ of habeas corpus is res-
tored, the President will be held accountable if he continues to 
detain individuals; his unilateral and unreviewable powers to 
detain have ended. 
The constitutional dictatorship is a dictatorship because 
the power conferred on the dictator combines elements of judi-
cial, legislative, and executive power. This combination is a 
dangerous brew; indeed, in The Federalist No. 47 Madison ar-
gued that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, execu-
 
 75. See Watkins, supra note 20, at 324. 
 76. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No. 
9487) (arguing that the President may detain without charges or a hearing 
only if Congress has suspended the writ). 
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tive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or 
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”77 Note 
that in this passage, the dictator may consist of “one, a few or 
many,”78 and Madison says nothing about how the dictator 
achieves power, whether through a coup or a regular election. 
Dictatorships can occur even in democracies, if the public gives 
officials unchecked powers.79 Finally, Madison hedges his def-
inition of tyranny by speaking of the accumulation of all pow-
ers.80 The more interesting question, however, is what happens 
if the powers extend only over certain subject matters, may on-
ly be exercised using certain specified means, or can be exer-
cised only for a certain limited time. The most interesting ex-
amples in the real world are limited in precisely these ways. 
Since they still combine judicial, legislative, and executive 
functions, perhaps we should call them limited or special-
purpose dictatorships.  
For example, if we assumed (which, thankfully, is not the 
case) that the American President has the power to initiate 
war, commandeer funds and resources for war, and conduct 
war at any time for any reason in any manner he pleases, he 
would be a constitutional dictator with respect to war and all 
matters related to war. That is because he would combine the 
right to assess the need for military action with the power to 
carry it out and with the sole right to judge whether what he 
did was lawful. (He would not be a dictator with respect to a 
wide range of other matters, including, for example, environ-
mental protection.) To the extent that the President may create 
rules in a certain area, apply them, and execute them on his 
own without the ability of anyone else in the system to check 
him, he is a law unto himself.81 
 
 77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 336. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. The Roman dictatorships were generally limited dictatorships. They 
lasted six months and usually bore descriptive names that described their 
substantive purpose—such as rei gerundae causa (“for getting things done,” a 
dictatorship for governing the state in an emergency), seditionis sedandae 
causa (for suppressing sedition or rebellion), or comitiorum habendorum causa 
(for summoning the assembly (comitia) for elections). See FRANK FROST AB-
BOTT, A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF ROMAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 183 
(3d ed. 1963); ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 21–22.  
Sulla’s dictatorship was styled legibus faciendis et reipublicae constituen-
dae causa (for the making of laws and settling of the constitution); unlike the 
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A constitutional dictatorship is constitutional because it 
comes with various limits prescribed by law and enforced by in-
stitutional structures.82 The dictator exercises power according 
to constitutional procedures that bring the dictatorship into be-
ing, end it, and structure its scope and reach.83 For example, 
the President might have complete discretion to gather foreign 
intelligence surveillance directed at persons outside the United 
States, but not within.84  
It should be obvious from this definition that many ele-
ments of republican government could be seen as “dictatorial” 
to the extent that they endow government actors with essen-
tially unreviewable discretion to set policy and execute it im-
mediately with the force of law. Think, for example, of Ben 
Bernanke’s decision to bail out troubled financial institutions in 
the fall of 2008,85 or the authority of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention to institute a quarantine.86 Conversely, 
many features of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes might 
seem to be constitutional to the extent that they bestow power 
on the dictator through legal forms.87  
If so, if there is no difference, at the end of the day, be-
 
rei gerundae causa, it had no time limit, although Sulla gave up power within 
a year. KEAVENEY, supra note 47, at 161–62, 164. Julius Caesar effectively de-
stroyed the legal practices and customs of the dictatorship; he was named dic-
tator repeatedly, originally styled as rei gerundae causa. See LUCIANO CANFO-
RA, JULIUS CAESAR: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE PEOPLE’S DICTATOR 289–90 
(Marian Hill & Kevin Windle trans., 2007). In 46 B.C. Caesar was named dic-
tator for ten years; his last dictatorship in 44 B.C., ominously, was styled per-
petuus (perpetual). MATTHIAS GELZER, CAESAR: POLITICIAN AND STATESMAN 
320, 337 (Peter Needham trans., 5th ed. 1968).  
 82. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
 83. See id. at 8–11. 
 84. For an example of this distinction, see the Foreign Intelligence Service 
Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2009). The difficulty, of 
course, arises when, as in the digital world, the distinction between foreign 
and domestic surveillance threatens to evaporate. 
 85. Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Fed-
eral Financing Regulators: Hearing of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Ur-
ban Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs). 
 86. See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2006) (outlining the powers of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to prevent the introduction, transmission, and 
spread of communicable diseases into the United States); Questions and An-
swers on the Executive Order Adding Potentially Pandemic Influenza Viruses 
to the List of Quarantinable Diseases, http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/qa 
-executive-order-pandemic-list-quarantinable-diseases.html (last visited May 
6, 2010). 
 87. See ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 10. 
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tween the director of the Federal Emergency Management Au-
thority (FEMA) commandeering resources to deal with an out-
of-control forest fire and Josef Stalin purging kulaks and collec-
tivizing agriculture?88 Perhaps some more paranoid elements of 
the public might think so. But this confuses the diminishing 
sunlight of four in the afternoon with the pitch darkness of four 
in the morning. No system of government, no matter how well 
prepared in advance, can do without discretion. This is particu-
larly true of a modern administrative state, which, from its in-
ception, has been in tension with traditional rule-of-law no-
tions.89 With respect to thousands of minute individual 
decisions—ranging from the allocation of resources in a public 
hospital to a police officer’s decision to stop and seriously in-
convenience a motorist or pedestrian—official discretion may 
be effectively unreviewable, or the government actor may com-
bine the creation of new rules with their application.90 
The hallmark of a constitutional system is that it reins in 
this discretion in various ways without ever fully eliminating 
it. In most cases, a constitutional system bounds discretion 
through statutory restrictions on the exercise of power, report-
ing and oversight mechanisms, and judicial review. We can 
nevertheless imagine a continuum of possibilities ranging from 
the discretion that always exists in the interstices of an admin-
istrative state all the way to very broad and effectively unre-
viewable delegations of discretionary power over fundamental 
issues of life, liberty, property, war, and peace. What we mean 
by constitutional dictatorship is the far end of that conti-
nuum—substantial patches of practically unreviewable discre-
tion with respect to issues of obvious and far-reaching impor-
tance that are embedded within a larger system of laws and 
judicial review.  
There is an important and obvious relationship between 
 
 88. See, e.g., ROBERT CONQUEST, THE HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET COL-
LECTIVIZATION AND THE TERROR-FAMINE 146–47, 322 (1986) (setting out the 
history of Stalin’s brutality in collectivizing agriculture during the 1930s). 
 89. The most famous English-language work making this argument is 
surely A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 10–12, 21–22 (9th ed. 1950). See RICHARD A. COSGROVE, THE RULE OF 
LAW: ALBERT VENN DICEY, VICTORIAN JURIST 66 (1980).  
 90. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND 
LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 10–11 (2005) for an unusually wide-ranging call 
for rethinking many of our basic presuppositions in light of the reality of the 
modern administrative state. See also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Ad-
ministrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1097, 1131–42 (2009) (noting the 
“grey holes” in federal administrative law). 
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constitutional dictatorship and the politics of emergency. 
Emergency, or at least claims of emergency, are the standard 
cause and the standard justification for creating dictator-
ships.91 Every dictatorship, it seems, begins with some sort of 
claim of crisis or emergency. Therefore, any study of constitu-
tional dictatorship—whether how to enjoy its benefits or to 
avoid its dangers—must necessarily study emergencies and 
how governments respond to them.  
Although the rhetoric of emergency is the standard justifi-
cation for dictatorship, dictatorial powers may not be connected 
to any real emergency. Moreover, even if dictatorship is initial-
ly justified by emergency, it may continue after the emergency 
is over.92 In this way, dictatorial powers may become norma-
lized.93 Executive officials, noting the ability of emergency to 
focus the public’s attention, and to route around the unusual 
impediments to reform, may find themselves in quest of ever-
new emergencies to justify the continuation of their authority. 
As we shall describe later, this leads to a policy of government 
through emergency, which normalizes dictatorial powers in a 
different way. Moreover, dictatorial powers may be granted be-
cause of the fear of an emergency, even if it has not yet materia-
lized. This gives incentives to magnify both the probability and 
the dangers of possible scenarios. Finally, by declaring an 
emergency, and bestowing dictatorial powers on itself, a gov-
ernment may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The executive 
judges the situation as an emergency deserving of dictatorial 
powers, makes rules that frame the situation in this way, and 
then acts on that framing, thereby confirming it. In this way, a 
successful dictatorship constructs reality according to its own 
needs and helps society believe that the dictatorship must con-
tinue to stave off threats and harms, both internal and exter-
nal.94  
 
 91. See Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tra-
deoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CAL. L. REV. 301, 302–07 (2009) (arguing that 
the prospect of foreseeable emergencies requires the preparation of rule-bound 
“protocols” designed to minimize the foreseeable prospect of panic and other 
irrationalities attached to the perception of crisis and emergency).  
 92. See ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 10. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Put in contemporary terms, the successful dictator co-opts “the reality-
based community” by generating new versions of “reality” that, not at all coin-
cidentally, assume the need for continued leadership by the executive. This 
strategy is vividly depicted in the now-classic article by Ron Suskind, pub-
lished three weeks before the 2004 presidential election. Ron Suskind, Without 
a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, (Magazine), at 44. Suskind quotes a senior 
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II.  THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP   
A. BUILDING EXECUTIVE POWER THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
Machiavelli argued that republics should plan for emer-
gency allocations of power in advance. Does the American con-
stitution meet Machiavelli’s test? Does it adequately build the 
possibilities of emergency into its design, to avoid the dangers 
of inertia, impotence, and deadlock yet still preserve republican 
government? Recall Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous 
statement in M’Culloch v. Maryland that “[the] constitution [is] 
intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”95 Notably, the 
word “crises” is italicized in the original opinion. Nevertheless, 
the text of the American Constitution is remarkably devoid of 
specific clauses that give government officials emergency pow-
ers. The most relevant example is the Suspension Clause, 
which allocates to Congress (contra the views of Abraham Lin-
coln) the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but only 
“in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety may 
require it.”96 Moreover, the Suspension Clause says nothing 
about other kinds of dangers, for example economic meltdowns, 
fires, floods and hurricanes, or even the invasion of a drug-
resistant virus. Nevertheless, constitutional emergencies may 
arise from many different sources.  
Although the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks 
understandably focused the public’s attention on issues of na-
tional security, more recent events, like fears of the swine flu 
epidemic and the economic collapse of 2008, demonstrate that 
 
(unnamed) aide of Bush explaining that: 
[G]uys like me [Suskind] were “in what we call the reality-based 
community,” which he defined as people who “believe that solutions 
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I nodded and 
murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiric-
ism. He cut me off. “That’s not the way the world really works any-
more,” he continued. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we 
create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—
judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, 
which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re 
history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what 
we do.” 
Id. at 51. 
 95. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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emergencies can take a variety of forms, both foreign and do-
mestic. It is important to recall that the primary chaos that 
pervaded Germany during the 1920s was economic.97 Most of 
the more than 250 presidential suspensions of rights under the 
notorious Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution98 concerned 
economic matters;99 government officials repeatedly turned to 
the mechanisms of emergency power as Germany struggled to 
respond to the economic and social difficulties created by its de-
feat in World War I, the Versailles treaty, and a society bitterly 
divided between left and right, Communists and Nazis.100 
The first decade of the twenty-first century has made us all 
too aware of the various dangers that can plague our social or-
ders; even the cost of terrorist attacks may pale in comparison 
to the damage wrought by tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, 
or dangerous viruses. Thus in 2009, the President of Mexico, 
Felipe Calderón, placed the entire country under a “state of 
emergency” because of the potential swine flu pandemic.101 As 
John Ackerman, chief editor of the Mexican Law Review has 
explained, this serves to:  
concentrate political power in his hands. . . . [President Calderón] has 
authorized his health secretary to inspect and seize any person or 
possessions, set up check points, enter any building or house, ignore 
procurement rules, break up public gatherings, and close down enter-
tainment venues. The decree states that this situation will continue 
‘for as long as the emergency lasts.’ . . . This action violates the Mex-
ican Constitution, which normally requires the government to obtain 
a formal judicial order before violating citizens’ civil liberties. Even 
when combating a ‘grave threat’ to society, the president is constitu-
 
 97. See, for example, the excellent chapters on Germany in LIAQUAT 
AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD 324–45 
(2009).  
 98. Article 48 provided that: 
If public safety and order in the German Commonwealth is materially 
disturbed or endangered, the National President may take the neces-
sary measures to restore public safety and order, and, if necessary, to 
intervene by force of arms. To this end he may temporarily suspend, 
in whole or in part, the fundamental rights established in Articles 
114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 [of the Constitution]. 
RENÉ BRUNET, THE NEW GERMAN CONSTITUTION 308 (Joseph Gollomb trans., 
1922). 
 99. AGAMBEN, supra note 39, at 15.  
 100. See, e.g., RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH 255–77 
(2004).  
 101. Thomas Black, Mexico’s Calderon Declares Emergency Amid Swine 
Flu Outbreak, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 25, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20670001&sid=aEsNownABJ6Q. 
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tionally required to get congressional approval for any suspension of 
basic rights. There are no exceptions to this requirement.102 
Ackerman notes that Latin America has a “long history of using 
states of emergency as ploys to . . . return to authoritarian-
ism.”103  
Because the text of the Constitution is silent on how to deal 
with most forms of emergencies or crises, the American legal 
system has largely proceeded through what Princeton political 
scientist Keith Whittington has termed “constitutional con-
struction.”104 Construction involves the implementation of the 
Constitution’s vague clauses and abstract principles—not to 
mention its silences—through the creation and application of 
precedents (both judicial and nonjudicial), congressional 
enactments, administrative regulations, and building of insti-
tutions with their own rules and practices. 
The most important place we might find elements of con-
stitutional dictatorship in the United States is in the construc-
tion of the modern presidency and the executive branch more 
generally. The Constitution says that the President is vested 
with “the executive Power” of the United States105 and is 
“Commander in Chief” of the armed forces.106 It also says, not-
ably, that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted.”107 
The modern President is far more powerful, and has far 
more resources at his disposal, than the Framers could possibly 
have imagined. To give only one example, the President is now 
commander-in-chief of a standing army of over a million people, 
with forces stationed all over the world, armed with weapons 
that no one in the eighteenth century could have envisioned. As 
the United States has become a global power, and as govern-
 
 102. See John M. Ackerman, An Outbreak of Opportunism: Mexico’s Presi-
dent Is Trying to Use the Swine Flu to Consolidate His Power, SLATE, Apr. 27, 
2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2217017/. 
 103. Id. It is worth noting that Ackerman’s objection may be directed less 
to the suspension of ordinary civil liberties than to Calderon’s failure to seek 
judicial authorization. 
 104. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–15 (1999); Jack M. Balkin, Frame-
work Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 566–69 
(2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1215, 1215–18, 1220–30 (2001); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Out-
side the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 449–61 (2007). 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 106. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 107. Id. art. II, § 3. 
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ment has taken on increasing responsibilities—to meet the in-
creasing expectations of its citizens—the presidency has gained 
ever greater power and discretion. Both the administrative and 
regulatory state on the one hand, and the National Security 
State, on the other, offer plenty of opportunities for decisive ac-
tion, whether it be bailing out financial institutions, announc-
ing bank holidays, imposing quarantines, seizing contraband 
merchandise, intercepting communications, engaging in covert 
operations, bombing overseas targets, or moving American 
troops into harm’s way.  
Generally speaking, the expansion of presidential authori-
ty and capacity has come through the creation of framework 
statutes by Congress that basically delegate vast authority to 
the President to build a national security and domestic bureau-
cracy and, in turn, empower members of these bureaucracies to 
make various decisions and regulations. Cornell political scien-
tist Theodore J. Lowi has described Congress since the New 
Deal as committing:  
legiscide . . . in the form of statutes virtually empty of content, stating 
a desired outcome without providing any guidelines. Each statute was 
and is a ‘delegation of power’ to the Executive Branch, authorizing the 
president to provide the substance of the laws or to sub-delegate poli-
cymaking to the relevant agency in the Executive Branch.108 
Lowi argues that this innovation has created a distinctive 
political regime within in the United States that he labels the 
“Fourth Republic.”109 Indeed, Lowi fears that we are headed 
toward an ominous “Fifth Republic” constituted by the devel-
opment of even stronger notions of executive prerogative that 
are legitimated by an increasingly plebescitarian conception of 
the presidency, one in which the President claims, through 
election, to speak and act on behalf of the nation as a whole.110 
Whether one accepts Lowi’s analysis, to understand the possi-
bilities (and the potential dangers) of constitutional dictator-
 
 108. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC 
OF THE UNITED STATES, at xiv (40th anniversary ed. 2009) (1979). These fea-
tures are not unique to the United States. See Mark Aronson, The Great De-
pression, This Depression, and Administrative Law, 37 FED. L. REV. 165, 201–
03 (2009) (discussing similar developments in other countries, particularly in 
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia).  
 109. The first three republics were structured, respectively, by the Articles 
of Confederation, the 1787 Constitution, and the Reconstruction Amendments 
added as the result of the breakdown of the Second Republic. LOWI, supra note 
108, at xii–xiv.  
 110. Id. at xvi–xvii.  
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ship in the United States, one must begin with the executive 
branch. 
B. PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND UNILATERAL ACTION 
One might object that no matter how strong the modern 
presidency has become, the American President cannot be a 
dictator because, after all, he or she is elected. But this is to 
miss the point that Madison made in The Federalist No. 47 
about what he called “tyranny” and this Article calls “dictator-
ship.” It is the combination of powers that gives rise to tyranny 
for Madison, not the presence of elections; elected tyrants are 
still tyrants. Elections, to be sure, help legitimate government 
action. But winning an election says nothing about the actual 
powers that one attains upon victory, and the degree of con-
straint (or lack thereof) over those powers.  
Nor does the fact of an election tell us how the President 
will be held accountable once he takes office. Effective accoun-
tability may be lacking even if the President’s actions are pub-
lic. Accountability is particularly problematic, however, if a 
President can keep his most controversial actions secret using 
the excuse of national security, if he enjoys multiple constitu-
tional privileges against suit, if courts regularly defer to his 
judgments about national security, and if Congress lacks effec-
tive oversight mechanisms to check his adventures. 
There is always, of course, recourse to the people. But elec-
tions are usually about many issues, not particular usurpa-
tions. (Indeed, they are usually about the health of the econo-
my, rather than whether the President has overstepped his 
bounds.)111 And after reelection, the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment ensures that a President never has to face that particular 
form of accountability again. 
One might argue that the Impeachment Clause112 sets up 
an alternative mechanism for accountability, but history has 
drained it of any use, especially in the absence of clearly crimi-
nal conduct by a President.113 It is worth noting that there are 
 
 111. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Econometrics and Presidential Elections 1, 
7 (Feb. 1997), http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/econpres.pdf (published in 
abbreviated form in 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 195 (1997)). 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 113. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 114–21 
(2006) (discussing and criticizing the Impeachment Clause). 
Indeed, in light of the Clinton impeachment, mere illegality may no longer 
be enough; some scholars argue that the Impeachment Clause is unavailing 
against anything other than truly “High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” or, at the 
  
2010] CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 1815 
 
many things that a President can do to the national interest far 
worse than violating the law. Displaying disastrous misjudg-
ment with regard to matters of war and peace, or needlessly in-
flicting death, destruction, and human suffering are not in and 
of themselves “High Crimes and Misdemeanors;” yet they 
might strike many Americans as far worse sins than, say, per-
jury or tax evasion. And as the Clinton impeachment demon-
strated, it is so difficult to convict and remove a President that 
most Presidents can assume that they will never face a genuine 
threat from this direction.114 
A President can be a constitutional dictator, then, to the 
extent that he is effectively insulated from hindrance and ac-
countability with respect to a certain set of issues. The most 
obvious examples concern war, foreign policy, intelligence, and 
covert operations, but, as we shall see later on, the modern ad-
ministrative state offers a number of opportunities in the do-
mestic sphere to deal with economic meltdowns, health crises, 
floods, fires, and other domestic disasters. 
Until recent times, the clearest example of a constitutional 
dictator was Abraham Lincoln, who had to deal with a civil war 
that was simultaneously a military question and a domestic 
emergency.115 By the time Lincoln took the oath of office on 
March 4, 1861, several states had already seceded, joined by 
several more after the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12. Nev-
ertheless, Lincoln delayed calling Congress into session until 
July 4. “The eleven weeks between the fall of Sumter and July 
 
very least, in the words of then-University of Chicago Professor Cass Sunstein, 
“egregious misconduct that amounts to the abusive misuse of the authority of 
his office.” See Hearing on Impeachment Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581 Be-
fore the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1998), reprinted in Testi-
mony Before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, 32 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 24, 
25 (1999), available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/TestimonyUSHouse 
Judiciary-Sunstein.pdf.  
 114. It is telling that even George W. Bush’s most fervent opponents—
including some who believed that Bush may have committed criminal of-
fenses—counseled against the Democrats pursuing his impeachment upon 
their recapture of Congress in the 2006 elections. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, 
Impeachment: The Case Against, THE NATION, Feb. 12, 2007, at 21–22, avail-
able at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070212/levinson (debating former Rep. 
Elizabeth Holtzman, who supported impeachment). The Democratic leader-
ship agreed; House Minority Leader (and later Speaker) Nancy Pelosi declared 
that even if the Democrats regained control of the House, the impeachment of 
President Bush would be “off the table.” See Charles Babington, Democrats 
Won’t Try to Impeach President, WASH. POST, May 12, 2006, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/11/AR2006051101950.html.  
 115. See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 223–39. 
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4, 1861,” Rossiter wrote, “constitute the most interesting single 
episode in the history of constitutional dictatorship. The simple 
fact that one man was the government of the United 
States . . . makes this the paragon of all democratic, constitu-
tional dictatorships.”116 
Lincoln was quite busy during this period. He goaded the 
South into beginning the war by resupplying Fort Sumter;117 he 
unilaterally decided to initiate a legally debatable blockade of 
all Southern ports;118 and then, most (in)famously, he sus-
pended habeas corpus,119 claiming that since Congress was 
away, somebody had to make the decision, and he was just the 
person to do it. Like any commissarial dictator, Lincoln argued 
that he acted only to save the republic, not to found a new re-
gime, and that his actions, even if they appeared illegal,120 were 
all calculated to that end. As he famously asked, “are all the 
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to 
pieces, lest that one be violated?”121 Lord Bryce wrote that Lin-
coln was “almost a dictator . . . who wielded more authority 
than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Crom-
well,”122 and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. recounts Lincoln’s Secre-
tary of State William H. Seward “exuberant[ly]” telling a cor-
respondent for the London Times that “[w]e elect a king every 
four years and give him absolute power within certain limits, 
which after all he can interpret for himself.”123 
 
 116. Id. at 224.  
 117. See, e.g., MAURY KLEIN, DAYS OF DEFIANCE: SUMTER, SECESSION, AND 
THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 336–37, 405 (1997).  
 118. See Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cas-
es: Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
STORIES 53–54 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
The blockade was upheld, by a 5 to 4 vote, in The Brig Amy Warwick (The 
Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 664–65 (1862). 
 119. See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 6, at 278–79. 
 120. See, e.g., Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. 
Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
 121. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 
1861), reprinted in BREST ET AL., supra note 6, at 278. 
 122. Id. at 159–60.  
 123. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., War and the Constitution: Abraham Lin-
coln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in LINCOLN THE WAR PRESIDENT: THE GET-
TYSBURG LECTURES 159–60 (Gabor S. Boritt ed., 1992). Watkins writes almost 
casually that “[t]he dictatorship of President Lincoln is an interesting case in 
point.” Watkins, supra note 20, at 366. Rossiter, by contrast, writes extensive-
ly of the dictatorial aspects of the Lincoln presidency and he describes Lincoln 
as the most obvious example of a “constitutional dictator.” See ROSSITER, su-
pra note 14, at 224–26. 
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Indeed, the fact that the United States holds elections for 
its President becomes a way of justifying the expansive powers 
of constitutional dictatorship, not limiting them. Consider the 
following exchange between reporter Helen Thomas and White 
House Press Secretary Dana Perino during a news briefing late 
in President George W. Bush’s second term:  
Thomas: “The American people are being asked to die and pay for [the 
Iraq War]. And you’re saying they have no say in this war?” 
Perino: “No, I didn’t say that Helen. But Helen, this president was 
elected⎯” 
Thomas: “Well, what it amounts to is you saying we have no input at 
all.” 
Perino: “You had input. The American people have input every four 
years, and that’s the way our system is set up . . . .”124 
The quote opening this Article demonstrates President 
Bush’s firm belief that, once elected, he owed no one any expla-
nations for his conduct as President.125 Vice President Dick 
Cheney’s remarks to Chris Wallace of Fox News in his final 
days in office are, if anything, even blunter about the un-
checked powers of the President: 
  [W]hen you take the oath of office . . . you take the oath to support 
and defend and protect the Constitution of the United States against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic.  
  There’s no question about what your responsibilities are in that 
regard. And again, I think that there are bound to be debates and ar-
guments from time to time, and wrestling back and forth, about what 
kind of authority is appropriate in any specific circumstance. 
  But I think that what we’ve done has been totally consistent with 
what the Constitution provides for.  
  The president of the United States now for 50 years is followed at 
all times, 24 hours a day, by a military aide carrying a football that 
 
Whether or not Lincoln’s admirers acknowledged that he was a dictator, 
Lincoln’s staunchest opponents were quite sure he was a tyrant. John Wilkes 
Booth, of course, cried out “sic semper tyrannis” (thus always to tyrants) as he 
shot our sixteenth President. See MICHAEL W. KAUFFMAN, AMERICAN BRUTUS: 
JOHN WILKES BOOTH AND THE LINCOLN CONSPIRACIES 7 (2004). Kauffman’s 
title demonstrates how important Roman analogies were to American political 
thought, for Booth surely viewed Lincoln as the American Caesar, who de-
served the same fate as befell Julius Caesar. Cf. Josh Chafetz, Impeachment 
and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568950 (arguing that the Fra-
mers recognized the danger that the emergence of tyrants posed to republics 
and adapted the impeachment process in part as an alternative to the tradi-
tional remedy of assassination). 
 124. Dan Froomkin, Bush’s Alternate Reality, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2008/03/21/BL200803210 
1852.html.  
 125. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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contains the nuclear codes that he would use and be authorized to use 
in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States.  
  He could launch a kind of devastating attack the world’s never 
seen. He doesn’t have to check with anybody. He doesn’t have to call 
the Congress. He doesn’t have to check with the courts. He has that au-
thority because of the nature of the world we live in.126 
Here, the former Vice President casually informed the 
American people that the President can start a nuclear war if 
he deems it appropriate, and nobody can stop him, almost cer-
tainly as an empirical matter and possibly as a legal one as 
well. That is as close to unconstrained power as one can im-
agine. 
Yet the President’s power is still circumscribed in other 
ways, as the exchange between Thomas and Perino suggests. 
Even the bitterest enemies of the Bush Administration, who be-
lieved that Bush and Cheney had systematically made disast-
rous misjudgments and may even have committed criminal of-
fenses, never genuinely worried that the President and Vice-
President would try to extend their terms of office by decree or 
that they would attempt to suspend the constitutionally re-
quired election and the inauguration of a successor. No matter 
how boldly presidents appear to act, the tradition of regular 
elections is firmly rooted in the American political system. One 
might invoke Lincoln’s solemn determination to go to the elec-
torate for reelection in 1864127 and FDR’s campaign for reelec-
tion in 1944. Indeed, it is this very certainty that elections will 
be held and that losers will acquiesce in a peaceful transition of 
power that establishes the United States as a constitutional re-
public.128 However much Bush and Cheney disagreed with the 
electorate’s decision to install a President with very different 
ideas about foreign policy, they handed over power to Barack 
Obama in January of 2009, as everyone assumed they would. 
We should cherish this aspect of our political system. But it 
does not negate the fact that on occasion many of our Presi-
dents, including (but not limited to) Lincoln, Roosevelt, Bush, 
or, now, Obama, are, on certain matters, constitutional dicta-
 
 126. Interview by Chris Wallace with Richard Cheney, Vice President of 
the United States, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 22, 2008), available at http://www.fox 
news.com/story/0,2933,470706,00.html (emphasis added). 
 127. See JOHN C. WAUGH, REELECTING LINCOLN: THE BATTLE FOR THE 
1864 PRESIDENCY 22, 202 (1997).  
 128. A poignant example of this is Al Gore’s concession in the 2000 presiden-
tial election. See Gore Concedes Presidential Election, CNN.COM, Dec. 13, 2000, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/13/gore.ends.campaign/ 
index.html. 
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tors—first, because they exercise basically unchecked powers 
on important questions of life and death; second, because they 
exercise these powers under the rules arguably set forth in the 
Constitution and laws; and third, because they retain their 
power only so long as the Constitution and laws allow them to. 
To be sure, the President’s dictatorial powers are ordinar-
ily latent.129 Perhaps Gerald Ford could have ordered a full-
scale nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. There is, however, no 
reason to believe that he was ever actually tempted or even en-
couraged to do so.130 Interestingly enough, that was not the 
case with Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. Each 
of them received advice from high-ranking military officers and 
other advisors that the United States should use its nuclear 
monopoly (in the case of Truman131) or its advantage in arms 
(in the case of Eisenhower and Kennedy) to launch a preemp-
tive attack on the Soviet Union and bring an end to what would 
then be a not-so-Cold War.132 
Latent traits, however, may become manifest when certain 
circumstances arise. Presidents may be particularly ambitious 
to leave a mark on history.133 Newly perceived threats may 
 
 129. See ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 219–21.  
 130. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 154–58 (2d ed. 2004) 
(describing the military operations initiated by the Ford Administration). 
 131. See STEVEN T. ROSS, AMERICAN WAR PLANS 1945–1950, at 74–75 
(1996); Gordon R. Mitchell & Robert P. Newman, By ‘Any Means’ Necessary: 
NSC-68 and Cold War Roots of the 2002 National Security Strategy 3–8 (Mat-
thew B. Ridgeway Ctr. for Int’l Studies at the Univ. of Pittsburgh, Working 
Paper No. 2006-5, 2006), available at http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/LinkClick 
.aspx?fileticket=1rpufk4qCIs%3d&tabid=232.  
 132. Eisenhower’s advisors, who believed that the Soviets would soon de-
velop a hydrogen bomb, advocated a preemptive strike against the Soviet Un-
ion while the United States still enjoyed a preponderance of atomic power, 
even if a few million Americans might be killed in the process. See Katie Ba-
con, Proceed With Caution, ATLANTIC.COM, Oct. 10, 2002, http://www.theatlantic 
.com/doc/200210u/int2002-10-10 (interview with James Fallows describing 
General Curtis LeMay’s advocacy of preemptive nuclear strikes against the 
Soviet Union during the 1950s). Eisenhower, who disapproved of “preventative 
war,” rejected their advice. See John S.D. Eisenhower, Ike’s Son Wonders What 
Ike Would Do Today, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, June 6, 2004, http://hnn 
.us/roundup/entries/5695.html. LeMay also served as Air Force Chief of Staff 
during the Kennedy Administration, and lost none of his aggressiveness where 
nuclear war was concerned. See MICHAEL DOBBS, ONE MINUTE TO MIDNIGHT: 
KENNEDY, KHRUSCHEV, AND CASTRO ON THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WAR 266–67 
(2008); EVAN THOMAS, ROBERT KENNEDY: HIS LIFE 206 (2000). 
 133. GEOFFREY PERRET, COMMANDER IN CHIEF: HOW TRUMAN, JOHNSON, 
AND BUSH TURNED A PRESIDENTIAL POWER INTO A THREAT TO AMERICA’S FU-
TURE 203–04 (2007) (explaining Johnson’s decision to escalate the Vietnam 
War). 
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emerge that lead presidents to justify armed conflict.134 Wheth-
er or not the 9/11 terrorist attacks “changed everything,” they 
certainly provided everything that a would-be constitutional 
dictator might wish for. Congress readily ceded broad new pow-
ers to the President, in the September 18, 2001 Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (AUMF),135 the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001,136 the Military Commissions Act of 2006,137 the Protect 
America Act of 2007,138 and the FISA Amendments Act of 
2008.139 Indeed, every time the President asked for broad new 
authorities from Congress, he received them.140 What is re-
markable is that given this record of acquiescence, the Bush 
Administration tried to grab still more discretionary power, 
through secret programs that violated existing law, and 
through theories of the President’s Article II powers that, it 
claimed, allowed the President to disregard any congressional 
regulations of his powers as commander-in-chief.141 
 
 134. See id. at 143–47 (describing Truman’s decision to intervene in Korea 
without a congressional declaration of war). 
 135. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 136. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 137. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 138. Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007). 
 139. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2468 (2008). 
 140. One might object that Congress did not give Bush everything that he 
asked for. See, e.g., Tom Daschle, Power We Didn’t Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 
23, 2005, at A21 (recounting the debate over the language of the AUMF). But 
members of Congress, including Senator Daschle, did little to resist the expan-
sion of presidential discretion in what the Administration called its “global 
war on terror.” See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERI-
AL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 121–22 
(2007). 
 141. The most dramatic assertion of such powers can be found in the noto-
rious “torture memo” written by John Yoo and signed by Jay Bybee, then head 
of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice and now a judge on 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to 
the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum], available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo 
20020801.pdf. For the discussion of the “Commander-in-Chief” powers within 
the memorandum, see id. at 31–39. Moreover, President Bush greatly ex-
panded the practice of issuing “signing statements” that rejected Congress’s 
ability to control the President’s authority as determined by the President 
himself. See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 140, at 228–49. 
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C. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOMESTIC POWERS  
What is the scope of the modern President’s quasi-
dictatorial powers? Even if his critics believed George W. Bush 
took the notion of presidential autonomy to excess, he and the 
Administration lawyers who defended presidential prerogatives 
were not creating an entirely new edifice.142 Congress has been 
willing to delegate increasing amounts of power to the Presi-
dent in both domestic and foreign affairs over the years; and it 
is well worth asking whether the Constitution imposes any sig-
nificant limits on this delegation. 
In the domestic arena, the Supreme Court last debated this 
question in the constitutional struggle over the New Deal in the 
1930s. At first the Supreme Court, supported by conservative 
Republicans, denounced “delegation run riot” unanimously in 
the famous Schechter Poultry decision invalidating the Nation-
al Recovery Authority.143 Shortly thereafter, the nondelegation 
doctrine died an unceremonious death,144 and the modern con-
servative Court has been unwilling to disinter it.145 In the area 
of foreign affairs, moreover, Congress has long assumed that it 
could delegate far more authority to the President through 
treaties and framework statutes.146 The conservative Republi-
can Justice George Sutherland might have joined in denounc-
ing the delegation of domestic power to the President during the 
New Deal, yet a year after Schechter Poultry he wrote the fam-
ous Curtiss-Wright opinion which, (quoting then-Congressman 
 
 142. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Under-
standing, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 741–48 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Leder-
man, Framing the Problem] (examining arguments in favor of expansive pres-
idential wartime powers). See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. 
Lederman, Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Constitutional 
History] (providing an analysis of presidential wartime powers from the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution through the George W. Bush Administration).  
 143. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring); see also Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 
388, 414–15 (1935) (concluding that a presidential order restricting interstate 
and international trade in “hot oil” constituted an excessive delegation without 
standards to the executive branch).  
 144. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424–27 (1944). 
 145. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 
(2001) (Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion). 
 146. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Re-
gime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 42–44 (1999). 
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John Marshall) described the President as the “sole organ” of 
the United States vis-à-vis the outside world.147  
Clinton Rossiter wrote his book, and presumably chose its 
title, before George W. Bush was born in 1948; his analysis of 
the American version of “constitutional dictatorship” is built on 
the actions of such luminaries as Lincoln, Wilson, and Roose-
velt,148 all of them wartime presidents. Were he alive to write a 
new edition, he could certainly find more than enough material 
in post-1948 Presidents. 
FDR’s successor, Harry Truman, began the use of atomic 
weapons in warfare;149 more important for the development of 
constitutional law, he unilaterally ordered the American mili-
tary to resist the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 
June 1950.150 This was the first major war that the United 
States fought that did not receive the imprimatur of a congres-
sional declaration.151 Historians and constitutional analysts in-
creasingly view the Truman presidency as a crossing of the Ru-
bicon toward the President’s unilateral power to order military 
force anytime and anywhere in the world.152 Truman also over-
 
 147. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
(1936); see also White, supra note 146, at 46–49 (discussing Sutherland’s pre-
judicial writings on foreign affairs power). 
 148. See ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 223–87.  
 149. See, e.g., MARTIN J. SHERWIN, A WORLD DESTROYED: HIROSHIMA AND 
THE ORIGINS OF THE ARMS RACE 231–32 (Vintage Books 1987).  
 150. See, e.g., PERRET, supra note 133, at 133–48 (describing Truman’s de-
cision to send American troops to Korea).  
 151. This point was made by at least two justices who joined in the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Sei-
zure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Youngstown invalidated Truman’s seizure of the 
nation’s steel mills; Truman justified the seizure as a way to provide essential 
war materiel to the troops fighting (and dying) in Korea. Justice Frankfurter 
noted that no firmly established “practice can be vouched for executive seizure 
of property at a time when this country was not at war, in the only constitu-
tional way in which it can be at war.” Id. at 611 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). He declared that “[i]t would pursue the irrelevant to reopen 
the controversy over the constitutionality of some acts of Lincoln during the 
Civil War,” which Frankfurter apparently did consider a constitutionally legi-
timated war. Id. Similarly, Justice Jackson emphasized that:  
Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war 
is entrusted only to Congress . . . . [N]o doctrine that the Court could 
promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a 
President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, 
and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the 
internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation’s 
armed forces to some foreign venture. 
Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 152. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 130, at 81–104 (detailing the constitu-
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saw the creation of the modern National Security State, featur-
ing permanent standing armies strewn around the globe and 
the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its secret 
budgets, covert operations, and often tenuous relationship to 
human rights and the rule of law.153 
Finally, Truman’s Administration argued vigorously (and 
successfully) for the creation of a “state secrets privilege” in 
United States v. Reynolds154⎯a case that rested, incidentally, 
on completely mendacious misrepresentations by the United 
States about the security interests involved.155 The privilege to 
hide government operations from courts and from the general 
public as state secrets is an essential tool in the kit of any 
would-be dictator, and there is no reason to believe that the 
Obama Administration has repudiated it.156 It is perhaps even 
more valuable than the suspension of habeas corpus, which on-
ly allows the President to detain specific individuals.157 A broad 
state-secrets privilege ensures immunity from judicial scrutiny 
in a wide swathe of cases where the President may plausibly 
claim that national security requires complete judicial absten-
tion.158 Usually he does not even have to support the claim with 
evidence, for that might undermine the security he seeks to 
maintain.159 
Dwight Eisenhower drew upon Truman’s example. He 
threatened to use nuclear weapons should an armistice not be 
reached in Korea.160 He secretly directed the CIA to help 
 
tional arguments concerning President Truman’s conduct of the Korean War). 
 153. See, e.g., TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA 
26–29 (2007).  
 154. 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953).  
 155. LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 17 (2006).  
 156. See Jake Tapper, Political Punch: Obama Administration Invokes 
State Secrets Privilege . . . Again, ABCNEWS.COM, Oct. 30, 2009, http://blogs 
.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/10/obama-administration-invokes-state-secrets 
-privilegeagain.html.  
 157. See FISHER, supra note 155, at 245–52.  
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See, e.g., Roger Dingman, Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War, 
13 INT’L SECURITY 50, 50 (1988–89). Although the head of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, advised Eisenhower to use nuclear weapons to 
relieve the siege against the French at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, Eisenhower 
resisted such advice, perhaps because of his own experience in the military 
during World War II. See Lawrence J. Korb, The U.S. Air Force’s Indifference 
Toward Nuclear Weapons, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, June 17, 2008, 
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overthrow the government of Iran in 1954,161 and he approved 
the ill-fated invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba that John F. 
Kennedy pursued shortly after becoming President in 1961.162 
(The failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, of course, led to fur-
ther secret activities directed against Fidel Castro.)163 
Nor should we forget John F. Kennedy’s actions during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.164 It is often viewed as Kennedy’s finest 
hour because the United States avoided a nuclear exchange 
with the Soviet Union.165 What is often overlooked in the dra-
matic tales surrounding those “thirteen days”166 of meetings in 
Washington with Kennedy and his Ex-Comm (Executive Com-
mittee of the National Security Council)167 is that everyone par-
ticipating assumed that it was up to the President to decide 
whether or not to embark on what would surely have become a 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union.168 The exact nature of the 
crisis was hidden from almost everyone in the country.169  
Kennedy’s acolyte Theodore Sorenson reports that at the 
time Kennedy estimated the odds of nuclear war at one in 
three.170 Interestingly enough, Abram Chayes, in his flattering 
 
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-us-air-forces-indifference-toward 
-nuclear-weapons. 
 161. See, e.g., WEINER, supra note 153, at 92–105 (offering details of what 
the CIA apparently regarded as its “greatest triumph”). 
 162. See, e.g., id. at 197–206.  
 163. See Tim Weiner, Robert McNamara, Architect of a Futile War, Dies, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at A20.  
 164. See generally DOBBS, supra note 132 (chronicling the events of the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis). 
 165. See, e.g., THEODORE C. SORENSON, KENNEDY 716–18 (1965). 
 166. See, e.g., ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1969). 
 167. See John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, The World on 
the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, http://www 
.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc_intro.html (last visited May 6, 2010).  
 168. E.g., SORENSON, supra note 165, at 694 (“It was the most difficult and 
dangerous decision any President could make, and only he could make it.”). 
 169. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara later recalled, President 
Kennedy decided “that only a limited number of senior officials would be in-
formed of the missile deployment in Cuba,” and that only a select group of fif-
teen officials, “the so-called Executive Committee of the National Security 
Council, or ‘ExComm,’ . . . would advise him throughout the crisis.” Robert S. 
McNamara, Forty Years After 13 Days, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 2002, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_11/cubanmissile. In addition, “[t]he Ex-
Comm would be required to radically restrict any information given to their 
associates, in order to help ensure that neither the press, Congress, nor the 
general public learned of the situation until the President was prepared to re-
spond to it.” Id. 
 170. SORENSON, supra note 165, at 705.  
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portrayal of Kennedy’s conduct during the Crisis,171 did not 
suggest that there was anything amiss in Kennedy’s risking 
nuclear annihilation. Kennedy’s behavior seems even more po-
tentially reckless if one accepts the argument made at the 
time—in secret, of course—by Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara that the Cuban missiles in fact posed little or no 
threat to actual American security.172 After all, the United 
States had an overwhelming nuclear stockpile and Soviet lead-
ers surely believed that the United States would use it in re-
sponse to any missiles fired from Cuba.173  
One is tempted to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis—and 
perhaps foreign wars in general—as purely problems of “foreign 
policy” or “international relations.” But these issues—and the 
ways presidents approach them—are often deeply influenced by 
domestic politics.174 One of the reasons that Kennedy found 
himself in such a delicate situation was the fact that constitu-
tionally required elections were about to take place for Con-
gress, and Republican New York Senator Kenneth Keating, 
among others, was denouncing him for being soft on Soviet pen-
etration of Cuba.175 Kennedy needed to retain healthy Demo-
cratic majorities in both the House and Senate because he 
could not always depend on Southern Democrats to support his 
“New Frontier” agenda.176 Kennedy was also concerned about 
his prospects for reelection in 1964.177  
 
 171. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 1–24 (1974); Sanford 
V. Levinson, Fidelity to Law and the Assessment of Political Activity (Or, Can 
a War Criminal Be a Great Man?), 27 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1191–99 (1975) (re-
viewing CHAYES, supra).  
 172. See Thomas S. Blanton & James G. Blight, A Conversation in Havana, 
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 2002, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_11/ 
cubanmissile (quoting McNamara during a 1992 conference as asserting, “[i]t 
was absurd to believe that the missiles in Cuba affected the global nuclear 
balance”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See, e.g., CAMPBELL CRAIG & FREDRIK LOGEVALL, AMERICA’S COLD 
WAR: THE POLITICS OF INSECURITY 360–70 (2009) (pointing out the intercon-
nection of domestic and international politics).  
 175. See James Reston, On Cuba and Pearl Harbor—the American Night-
mare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1962, at A1. 
 176. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: THE PRESI-
DENCY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY (1965). 
 177. See CRAIG & LOGEVALL, supra note 174, at 204–05. Kennedy had re-
ceived only 49.7% of the popular vote in the 1960 election. See United States of 
America Presidential Election of 1960: Popular Vote and Electoral College 
Vote by State, http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1960.txt (last 
visited May 6, 2010). 
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The Cuban Missile Crisis shows the two sides of presiden-
tial dictatorship. On the one hand, it reveals the President’s 
constitutional and practical ability, on his own, to order an at-
tack on Cuba that would trigger a Soviet move on Berlin and 
possibly a far more dangerous response.178 On the other hand, 
it shows the interplay between this unilateral power and do-
mestic politics—including the public’s ability to vote him out of 
office in 1964.179 
The fact that Kennedy stopped short of precipitating an all-
out war was not because the Constitution forbade it, but due to 
judgments of prudence.180 But a prudent dictator is still a dicta-
tor. In fact, one could easily argue that Kennedy, the President 
of a constitutional democracy, had at least as much discretion 
as his counterpart in the Kremlin. After all, Nikita Khrushchev 
paid for his commendable caution with his job, which suggests 
a degree of accountability that made the Soviet leader signifi-
cantly less of a full-scale dictator than most Americans as-
sumed.181  
Since Kennedy’s presidency, constitutional understandings 
about the power of the presidency have not reduced presiden-
tial discretion; they have only encouraged it.182 The President is 
surrounded by advisors and lawyers who are only too happy to 
argue that the President enjoys an ever-wider discretion, 
whether because of the President’s inherent authority under 
Article II or because Congress has authorized it in framework 
statutes.183 
Devotees of presidential power are fond of pointing out that 
the President’s powers in Article II differ from Congress’s pow-
ers listed in Article I because Article II does not limit the Pres-
ident to “all . . . powers herein granted” but says instead that 
“The Executive power shall be vested” in the President of the 
 
 178. See SORENSON, supra note 165, at 694. 
 179. See CRAIG & LOGEVALL, supra note 174, at 204. 
 180. See DOBBS, supra note 132, at 350–53.  
 181. See id. at 348–49. Just as most Americans probably recoil at the de-
scription of our presidents as even limited “dictators,” they are likely to over-
look the fact that foreign dictators are always part of wider institutional net-
works that can pose threats to their continuation in power—and, of course, 
often their lives. 
 182. See FISHER, supra note 130, at 127. 
 183. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, Constitutional History, supra note 142, 
at 1067–68 (describing then Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist’s 
defense of President Nixon’s authority as commander-in-chief to invade Cam-
bodia). 
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United States.184 John Yoo, the author of the notorious “torture 
memos,”185 has argued that, despite American objections to 
King George III, the President still enjoys the powers possessed 
by the English monarch at the time of the American Revolu-
tion.186 Although Parliament retained the powers of the purse, 
Yoo explains, the King possessed unbounded discretion over the 
use of military force.187 Thus, according to the Office of Legal 
Counsel’s memoranda, when the President acts according to his 
powers as commander-in-chief, he is for all intents and purpos-
es a dictator—or, if one prefers, a constitutional monarch—
because neither the Congress nor the courts may interfere with 
his decisions; at most Congress can refuse to appropriate new 
money for his adventures.188 Scholars of all political persua-
sions have criticized Yoo’s conclusions,189 but the fact that his 
arguments are particularly clumsy does not mean that there 
are not other, less aggressive ways of making the case for pres-
idential authority.190  
No one should assume that the end of the Bush presidency 
meant the end of lawyerly arguments for increased presidential 
 
 184. See Bybee Memorandum, supra note 141, at 37 (quoting the first sen-
tence of Article II and then stating: “[t]hat sweeping grant vests in the Presi-
dent an unenumerated ‘executive power’ and contrasts with the specific enu-
meration of the powers—those ‘herein’ granted to Congress by Article I”).  
 185. See, e.g., John H. Richardson, “Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Re-
sponds to this Week’s Revelations, ESQUIRE, Apr. 3, 2008, http://www.esquire 
.com/the-side/qa/john-yoo-responds. 
 186. See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 32–33 (2005) (explaining the allocation 
of powers between King and Parliament). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Jack M. Balkin, Reductio Ad Dictatorem, BALKINIZATION, Apr. 7, 
2006, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/reductio-ad-dictatorem.html. 
 189. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND 
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 141–76 (2008); David Cole, 
What Bush Wants to Hear, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 17, 2005, at 8, 8–12 (re-
viewing YOO, supra note 186); David Luban, The Defense of Torture, N.Y. REV. 
OF BOOKS, Mar. 15, 2007, at 37, 37–40 (reviewing JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER 
MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2007)). 
 190. Moreover, as Rossiter’s book suggests, long before the Bush Adminis-
tration, government lawyers had justified ever-stronger conceptions of presi-
dential power while other scholars had denounced these dangerous tendencies. 
See ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 306–14. Consider, as an example, political 
scientist David Gray Adler’s analysis of the Clinton Administration’s claims 
about presidential authority in the realm of foreign affairs: “[a]s things stand 
today . . . power has replaced law, usurpation has replaced amendment, and 
executive fiat has replaced constitutionalism.” David Gray Adler, Clinton, the 
Constitution, and the War Power, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE 
CLINTON LEGACY 46 (David Gray Adler & Michael A. Genovese eds., 2002). 
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discretion and presidential power. We have argued elsewhere 
that President Bush’s successors, beginning with Barack Ob-
ama, will be able to present themselves as more moderate by 
rejecting the Bush Administration’s most radical claims while 
staking out slightly less extreme claims to executive authori-
ty.191 
The central idea of constitutional dictatorship, after all, is 
that the President does not seize power.192 Rather, his power is 
bestowed on him, either by the Constitution directly, or, more 
likely, by framework statutes and authorizations passed by 
Congress.193 Presidents (or more correctly, the Presidents’ law-
yers) tend to read these statutes and authorizations as broadly 
as possible, so that the President can have as free a hand as 
possible to save the nation.194 In fulfilling these authorizations, 
the President creates new institutions and mechanisms that, in 
turn, bestow new kinds of authority and new kinds of power.195 
Thus, the great mistake of the Bush Administration was the 
assumption that presidents should go out of their way to claim 
power unilaterally. It is far more effective to ask for power and 
have it given. Then one can proliferate the powers of the office 
through making broad constructions, through building institu-
tions, and through issuing regulations. 
The expansion of presidential power knows no party. It 
was, after all, President Clinton who sent American troops to 
Haiti and American bombers to the South Balkans without ex-
plicit congressional authority.196 (For this he was criticized by, 
 
 191. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional 
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 529–33 (2006). 
 192. See ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 4–5.  
 193. See id. 
 194. Our friend and colleague Bruce Ackerman has recently argued, in his 
Tanner Lectures delivered at Princeton in April 2010, that a major develop-
ment over the last several decades is the increased importance of the Office of 
Legal Counsel as the de facto non-Article III court of last resort within the ex-
ecutive branch, as well as the exponential growth of the office of the White 
House Counsel, which increasingly feels empowered to weigh in on the merits 
of legal disputes about presidential power (and, not surprisingly, finds that the 
President in fact possesses vast powers). BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE 
AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 130, 
on file with authors). 
 195. See ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 288–90. 
 196. See Barron & Lederman, Constitutional History, supra note 142, at 
1090–91 n.619.  
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of all persons, John Yoo himself.197) And when President Ob-
ama announced the escalation of American forces in Afghanis-
tan on December 1, 2009, at West Point,198 he based the auth-
ority for his decision on the 2001 AUMF,199 ignoring the 
inconvenient fact that this authorization was based on circum-
stances and assumptions that may no longer hold today. Presi-
dent Obama will, of course, continue to need to seek additional 
funding from Congress, but there is little reason to believe that 
Congress will refuse to support troops who are risking their 
lives on behalf of the national goals declared by the President. 
Nor is there any reason to believe that Obama will feel bound 
by the War Powers Act, which all Presidents (with the excep-
tion of Jimmy Carter) have regarded as unconstitutional since 
its enactment.200 The War Powers Act was passed over Richard 
Nixon’s veto during the nadir of his presidency, and since then 
has been honored more in the breach than in the observance.201 
The most obvious elements of presidential dictatorship 
tend to be concentrated in areas of foreign policy, intelligence 
gathering, covert operations, and warfare. Presidents exercise 
far less unilateral control in domestic politics.202 Harry Truman 
once imagined the problems that his successor, General Dwight 
 
 197. John C. Yoo, The Imperial President Abroad, in THE RULE OF LAW IN 
THE WAKE OF CLINTON 159 (Roger Pilon ed., 2000) (arguing that “the record of 
the administration has not been a happy one, in light of its costs to the Consti-
tution and the American legal system,” and pointing out that “[o]n a series of 
different international relations matters, such as war, international institu-
tions, and treaties, President Clinton has accelerated disturbing trends in for-
eign policy that undermine notions of democratic accountability and respect 
for the rule of law”). 
 198. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Ad-
dress to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dec. 1, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president 
-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 
 199. Id. (“Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against 
al Qaeda and those who harbored them—an authorization that continues to 
this day.”). 
 200. Cf. Dahlia Lithwick, What War Powers Does the President Have?, 
SLATE, Sept. 13, 2001, http://www.slate.com/id/1008290 (stating that the War 
Powers Act “looks good on paper, but presidents have generally ignored [it], 
citing Article II, Section 2 as their authority to send soldiers into combat”). 
 201. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 48–49 (1993).  
 202. We should not, however, underestimate the ability of a dedicated Pres-
ident to influence decisionmaking by administrative agencies and, therefore, 
to procure policy victories that Congress might have denied him. See Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001).  
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Eisenhower, would face once in the White House.203 Ike would, 
suggested Truman, come to the White House believing that he 
could issue orders as he had before and rely on their implemen-
tation.204 He would be sorely disappointed. “He’ll sit 
here, . . . and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ . . . Poor Ike—it won’t 
be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.”205 Or, as 
Truman put it in a letter to his sister:  
The people can never understand why the President does not use his 
supposedly great power to make ’em behave. Well, all the President 
is, is a glorified public relations man who spends his time flattering, 
kissing and kicking people to get them to do what they were supposed 
to do anyway . . . .206 
Political scientist Richard Neustadt has argued that the 
President ultimately has only the “power to persuade,”207 since 
there are many ways that his wishes, however clearly ex-
pressed, could be negated prior to implementation.208 This only 
underscores the point that it is misleading to think of the Pres-
ident as a “constitutional dictator” in general terms, especially 
when it comes to domestic policy. 
To be sure, the President can, through unilateral action, 
prevent many things from happening. For example, presidents 
successfully veto legislation backed even by healthy (though 
not two-thirds) majorities in both houses of Congress.209 This is 
not so much an example of “constitutional dictatorship” as an 
additional veto point in a republican system that is already full 
(some would say too full) of such barriers to reform.210 The 
President also can act unilaterally and virtually without limits 
in his use of the pardon power.211 Certain Anti-Federalists were 
critical of the potential for misuse of the pardoning power for 
this reason: they feared the President would pardon allies who 
 
 203. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEA-
DERSHIP FROM FDR TO CARTER 9 (1960). 
 204. See id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. PERRET, supra note 133, at 138. 
 207. NEUSTADT, supra note 203, at 10.  
 208. See id. 
 209. Cf. LEVINSON, supra note 113, at 40 (“More than 95 percent of all pres-
idential vetoes are successful . . . .”). 
 210. See id. at 9. 
 211. See JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 29 (2009). 
See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (stating that the President “shall 
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United 
States, except in Cases of Impeachment”). 
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joined in a “cabal” to threaten the liberties of Americans.212 
Some two hundred years later, we see glimmers of what the 
Anti-Federalists were worried about, the most obvious exam-
ples being George H.W. Bush’s Christmas Eve 1992 pardon of 
colleagues who had pled guilty or had been indicted or con-
victed in connection with their participation in the Iran-Contra 
affair.213 This pardon effectively quashed any further investiga-
tion into illegal conduct during the Reagan Administration, in 
which Bush served as Vice President.214 
American Presidents enjoy few unilateral powers with re-
spect to domestic issues because most of these issues do not ap-
pear to affect national security or involve emergencies. Never-
theless, the line between national security and domestic affairs 
is often difficult to draw, and increasingly so in a globalized en-
vironment. Foreign intelligence can take place anywhere, in-
cluding within the United States.215 Biological and environ-
mental threats do not respect national borders, nor, for that 
matter, do cyberattacks.216 
Likewise, many kinds of emergencies are domestic, wheth-
er they involve natural disasters, diseases, threats to the na-
tional power grids, cyberattacks on defense installations or fi-
nancial institutions, or economic crises. Government actors 
must move quickly to identify and meet these threats, or to 
head them off before they occur. Indeed, President Bush began 
to lose political momentum precisely because he failed to act 
swiftly or deftly in the face of a domestic disaster, Hurricane 
 
 212. See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the 
Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, PA. PACKET AND DAILY AD-
VERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, available at http://www.constitution.org/afp/penn_ 
min.txt (warning that the President, “having the power of pardoning without 
the concurrence of a council, . . . may skreen [sic] from punishment the most 
treasonable attempts that may be made on the liberties of the people, when 
instigated by his coadjutors in the senate”). 
 213. See Dian McDonald, Bush Pardons Weinberger, Five Others Tied to 
Iran-Contra, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, Dec. 24, 1992, available at http://www.fas 
.org/news/iran/1992/921224-260039.htm. 
 214. More recently, people criticized George W. Bush’s commutation of 
Scooter Libby’s sentence. Jim Rutenberg & Jo Becker, Aides Say No Pardon 
for Libby Irked Cheney, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A14, but this episode 
seems to pale by comparison. Moreover, Bush refused to grant Libby a full 
pardon at the end of his presidency. Id. 
 215. See Peter Baker, Obama Making Plans to Use Executive Power, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, at A13. 
 216. See Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterror-
ism: An Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 1, 7–12. 
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Katrina.217 Since the Calling Forth Act of 1792,218 Congress has 
repeatedly created framework statutes that authorize presi-
dents to respond to domestic emergencies.219 These framework 
statutes authorize executive regulations and orders that fur-
ther empower executive officials, and they create abundant op-
portunities for unilateral discretion in the domestic sphere.220 
For example, one thing dictators must do in emergencies is 
detain people who pose threats to public safety. The Public 
Health Service Act gives the Surgeon General, subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
authority “to make and enforce such regulations as in his 
judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmis-
sion, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries 
into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession 
into any other State or possession.”221 Accordingly, the Surgeon 
General may order “inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanita-
tion, pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles 
found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dan-
gerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as in his 
judgment may be necessary.”222 The grant of authority may 
even provide for “apprehension, detention, or conditional re-
lease of individuals” if necessary “for the purpose of preventing 
the introduction, transmission, or spread of such communicable 
diseases as may be specified from time to time in Executive Or-
ders of the President upon the recommendation of the Secre-
tary, in consultation with the Surgeon General.”223 
Or consider the steps the executive may take to meet the 
threat of imminent economic collapse. During the dark days of 
1933, many people hoped that President Roosevelt, once inau-
gurated, would self consciously take on dictatorial powers to 
head off the gathering economic crisis.224 As Jonathan Alter 
 
 217. See Kathleen Frankovic, Bush’s Popularity Reaches Historic Lows, 
CBSNEWS.COM, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/15/ 
opinion/pollpositions/main4724068.shtml. 
 218. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795). 
 219. See Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424; Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 
25, 12 Stat. 281. 
 220. See, e.g., 12 Stat. at 281. 
 221. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. § 264(b). 
 224. JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT: FDR’S HUNDRED DAYS 
AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE 5 (2006). 
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writes in the prologue to his recent book on FDR’s first Hun-
dred Days:  
[the] word ⎯“dictator”⎯had been in the air for weeks, endorsed va-
guely as a remedy for the Depression by establishment figures rang-
ing from the owners of the New York Daily News, the nation’s largest 
circulation newspaper, to Walter Lippmann, the eminent columnist 
who spoke for the American political elite. “The situation is critical, 
Franklin. You may have no alternative but to assume dictatorial pow-
ers,” Lippmann had told FDR during a visit to Warm Springs on Feb-
ruary 1, before the crisis escalated. Alfred E. Smith, the Democratic 
nominee for president in 1928, recalled with some exaggeration that 
“during the World War we wrapped the Constitution in a piece of pa-
per, put it on the shelf and left it there until the war was over.” The 
Depression, Smith concluded, was a similar “state of war.” Even 
Eleanor Roosevelt, more liberal than her husband, privately sug-
gested that a “benevolent dictator” might be what the country needed. 
The vague idea was not a police state but deference to a strong leader 
unfettered by Congress or the other inconveniences of democracy.225 
Alfred M. Landon, the Republican Governor of Kansas who 
would become Roosevelt’s opponent in the 1936 election, de-
clared that “[e]ven the iron hand of a national dictator . . . is in 
preference to a paralytic stroke.”226 And Barron’s, a business 
weekly, stated that “a mild species of dictatorship will help us 
over the roughest spots in the road ahead.”227  
Roosevelt declined the invitation.228 Instead, as Presidents 
often have done in our nation’s history, he procured legislation 
from a compliant—and justifiably “scared”229—Congress that 
delegated vast new powers to the executive branch with min-
imal deliberation.230 In fact, the process of extraordinary dele-
 
 225. Id. 
 226. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING 
OF THE NEW DEAL 3 (1958). 
 227. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW 
DEAL 30 (1963). 
 228. See Frank R. Kent, White House Technique, 9 VA. Q. REV. 372, 372–74 
(1933). 
 229. Id. (attributing Roosevelt’s achievements during the Hundred Days, in 
part, to the joint presence of a “thoroughly scared country” and “a thoroughly 
scared Congress”). Clinton Rossiter, who cites Kent’s article, ROSSITER, supra 
note 14, at 259 n.12, also quotes Harold Laski’s observation that “[i]n a cri-
sis, . . . public opinion compels the abrogation of the separation of powers. 
There is really only one will in effective operation, and that is the will of the 
president.” Id. (quoting HAROLD J. LASKI, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, AN IN-
TERPRETATION 154–55 (1940)).  
 230. On the evening of March 9, 1933, Congress received “a single copy of 
[the] emergency banking bill,” and, by 8:30 p.m., Congress passed it. Roger I. 
Roots, Government by Permanent Emergency: The Forgotten History of the New 
Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259, 266 (2000). A Republican oppo-
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gation began even before Roosevelt took office. For example, the 
apparent legal authority for the remarkable acts of Henry 
Paulsen and Ben Bernanke during the Bear Stearns crisis was 
an obscure 1932 law, passed during the last year of the Hoover 
Administration (over Hoover’s veto), that delegated almost ab-
solute discretion to the Federal Reserve Board to act in the case 
of a banking crisis.231 As already noted, critics of the New 
Deal—and the members of the Supreme Court in Schechter 
Poultry—might well have labeled Bernanke’s actions as exem-
plifying the problems of “delegation running riot.”232 But the 
point of the modern state, whether we define it as a “national 
security” state or simply “the administrative state,” is that 
people often perceive such delegation as “necessary and prop-
er,” even if it leaves traditional notions of the rule of law in its 
wake.233 
 
nent, Pennsylvania Representative McFadden told his colleagues, “I regret 
that the membership of the House has had no opportunity to consider or even 
read this bill. . . . It is an important banking bill. It is a dictatorship over 
finance in the United States. It is complete control over the banking system in 
the United States.” 77 CONG. REC. 80 (1933) (statement of Rep. McFadden). “I 
expect to vote for the bill,” said Texas Senator Thomas Connally, “though it 
contains grants of powers which I never before thought I would approve in 
time of peace.” Id. at 65 (statement of Sen. Connally). Virginia Senator Carter 
Glass told his colleagues that “[t]here are provisions in the bill to which in or-
dinary times I would not dream of subscribing, but we have a situation that 
invites the patriotic cooperation and aid of every man who has any regard for 
his country.” Id. at 58 (statement of Sen. Glass). 
 231. See David Fettig, Lender of More Than Last Resort, THE REGION 14 
(2002), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf. See gen-
erally Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, ch. 520, § 210, 
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may authorize extraordinary loans). Fettig notes that “the 1932 amendment,” 
itself amended by 1934 legislation, “is only meant to address crisis situations.” 
Fettig, supra, at 18 (emphasis added). 
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IC 161 (2009) (“Bernanke and [then President of the New York Federal Re-
serve Timothy] Geithner knew Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act ex-
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and exigent’ would be so alarming it could make matters worse.”). 
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(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
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Many of FDR’s most important exercises of unilateral pow-
er involved issues of war and peace,234 such as ordering mili-
tary support for Great Britain in the days leading up to Ameri-
ca’s entry into World War II.235 Yet one should not lose sight of 
the many assertions of power he made concerning the economy, 
some of which he justified on national security grounds.236 Da-
vid Barron and Martin Lederman describe a “notorious speech” 
that Roosevelt made in September 1942, in which he stated 
that, should Congress not repeal a certain provision of the 
Emergency Price Control Act, he would simply decline to en-
force it to “avert a disaster which would interfere with the win-
ning of the war.”237 Rossiter terms this speech “[t]he broadest 
statement of his presidential powers that Mr. Roosevelt ever 
made—a statement able to stand comparison with the most ex-
treme of President Lincoln’s assertions.”238 Rossiter argues that 
“[i]t is unfortunate for the history of constitutional dictatorship 
that Congress finally gave in to the President’s peremptory 
threat,”239 because it prevented a serious constitutional debate 
about how much power the President should enjoy.240 But, in 
fact, nothing is more familiar in American constitutional histo-
ry than the episode Rossiter describes: Congress acquiesces to 
presidential requests for increased discretionary power. What 
the New Deal generated was a greatly increased congressional 
power to comply with those requests. 
If American constitutional dictatorship made its most 
noteworthy appearance in Abraham Lincoln’s presidency, there 
can be no doubt that the constitutional mechanisms that per-
mitted its expansion arose out of the New Deal and the Nation-
al Security State. Since the 1940s, it became hornbook constitu-
tional law that Congress may constitutionally delegate wide-
 
 234. See Barron & Lederman, Constitutional History, supra note 142, at 
1042–55. 
 235. Id. at 1044–47. 
 236. See, e.g., id. at 1052 n.458. 
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ron & Lederman, Constitutional History, supra note 142, at 1051.  
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 239. Id. at 269. 
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ranging discretionary authority to the President and adminis-
trative agencies.241 It is worth emphasizing that the key devel-
opment in the modern state has been an expansion of Con-
gress’s power to regulate a wide range of social and economic 
questions, and to delegate the power to regulate these matters 
to others. Without those powers, the President could not con-
struct the administrative state, or invoke federal power to regu-
late all the matters that Congress itself may regulate. Although 
we identify discretionary powers with the executive, constitu-
tional dictatorship in the United States was facilitated by loosen-
ing the constitutional checks that bound Congress. The reason 
the President became so powerful in the modern period is that 
Congress became powerful first. 
D. THE CHARACTERISTIC PATTERN OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 
The example of Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 became the 
characteristic pattern for the American experiment in constitu-
tional democracy (and constitutional dictatorship): it is not the 
direct assertion of unilateral power, but the urgent request to 
Congress for authorization in a crisis, followed by the preserva-
tion of these powers in later years and their expansion through 
broad interpretation by the executive branch. American Presi-
dents, as a rule, do not seize dictatorial powers. Instead, they 
ask for them in the midst of an emergency (whether genuine or 
purported) and Congress complies. Presidents then bank these 
powers away, build on them, employ lawyers to elaborate on 
them, and then wield them as they think necessary when a fu-
ture crisis occurs. In this tradition of asking first, Abraham 
Lincoln may seem the outlier. But even Lincoln sought justifi-
cation after the fact from Congress for his actions, and Con-
gress, as usual, gave the President its blessing, albeit retroac-
tively.242 Similarly, President Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration 
of a banking holiday on March 4, 1933, was quickly followed by 
the March 9, 1933, Emergency Banking Relief Act, which “ap-
proved and confirmed” Roosevelt’s actions.243  
Recognizing this pattern places the recent presidency of 
George W. Bush in a useful light. It makes Bush’s experience 
 
 241. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755 (granting au-
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War). 
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during his two terms in office far less unusual than his critics 
have supposed. Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks, George W. Bush played according to the standard script 
by announcing the existence of an emergency threatening the 
nation’s survival and asking Congress for new powers to deal 
with it.244 Congress replied eagerly, first with the September 
18, 2001, AUMF,245 and then with the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001.246 Congress also reorganized government agencies, con-
solidated the intelligence services, and created a new Depart-
ment of Homeland Security,247 a reform Bush initially opposed, 
but later supported and used to his political advantage.248 To 
this extent, Bush’s actions match the traditional pattern. First, 
the President declares a crisis or emergency, then he asks for 
new powers, and, finally, Congress grants the request. Howev-
er, Bush also sought to obtain additional emergency powers 
without asking for congressional approval in three areas: his 
policy on detentions and interrogation practices, his creation of 
military commissions, and his secret domestic surveillance pro-
grams. This was his great mistake, and the source of some of 
the most ardent (and well-deserved) criticism. 
Bush received pushback from the public and from the 
courts because he deviated from the traditional script for Amer-
ican Presidents seeking emergency authority. Instead of asking 
Congress for emergency powers, he simply asserted that he al-
ready possessed all the constitutional and legal authority he 
needed.249 Bush drew on expansive interpretations of the Pres-
ident’s Article II powers and the statutory grants of power 
created by previous Congresses. The result was decidedly 
mixed. The Court held some of his detention practices unconsti-
tutional in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,250 and declared his military 
commissions plan unconstitutional in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.251 
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There also was considerable public outcry against his use of 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, his secret use of torture, and his do-
mestic surveillance program.252 
In Bush’s second term, however, he appeared to have 
learned his lesson. Repeatedly using the language of crisis and 
urgency, Bush convinced Congress to legitimate important 
elements of his detention policies in the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006,253 and his surveillance policies in the Protect 
America Act of 2007254 and FISA Amendments Act of 2008.255 
Whether or not these delegations were wise, by going to Con-
gress for expanded authority, George W. Bush followed a hal-
lowed tradition in the construction of American constitutional 
dictatorship.256 
Since World War II, there has been one major exception to 
the standard pattern of asking and receiving congressional 
permission for emergency powers: Harry Truman’s 1950 deci-
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sion to invade Korea without either a declaration of war or a 
congressional authorization.257 Three things are interesting 
about Truman’s example, which is an underappreciated mo-
ment in the development of the modern National Security 
State, and a watershed event in the development of the modern 
presidency. First, Truman argued that America’s treaty obliga-
tions authorized him to act.258 He argued that the United Na-
tions Charter, ratified by the Senate immediately following 
World War II, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
justified the police action in Korea.259 Second, since Truman, 
presidents often assert the right to begin wars without congres-
sional authorization, yet they generally seek (and obtain) con-
gressional authorization to maintain political legitimacy for 
their actions.260 Third, when Truman pushed too hard and tried 
to seize the nation’s steel mills to support the Korean War ef-
fort, the Supreme Court pushed back in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.261 Truman’s construction of the National 
Security State, including his invasion of Korea, forever changed 
the powers of the presidency, but it did not change the basic 
pattern of American constitutional dictatorship. 
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E. DISTRIBUTED DICTATORSHIP 
A focus on executive power as the engine of constitutional 
dictatorship naturally leads people to identify dictatorship with 
a single individual, the President of the United States. But this 
is incorrect. Dictatorial power is almost inevitably dispersed in 
the modern administrative state. Policy questions in the mod-
ern state increasingly require specialized expertise. Even the 
most able of presidents likely lack the detailed knowledge nec-
essary for quick and decisive action. Consider this New York 
Times article, entitled Fed Chief Shifts Path, Inventing Policy 
in Crisis: 
  As chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben S. Bernanke has long 
argued that a central bank should base its policies as much as possi-
ble on consistent principles rather than seat-of-the-pants judgment. 
  But now, as the meltdown in credit markets threatens major insti-
tutions on Wall Street and a recession appears inevitable, Mr. Ber-
nanke is inventing policy on the fly. 
  “Modern monetary policy-making puts a lot of weight on rules, but 
there is no rule book for an economic crisis,” said Douglas W. Elmen-
dorf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former Fed 
economist. 
  On Friday, the Federal Reserve seemed to toss out the rule book 
altogether when it assumed the role of white knight, temporarily bail-
ing out Bear Stearns, one of Wall Street’s biggest firms, with a short-
term loan to help avoid a collapse that might send other dominoes 
falling.262 
 At first glance, this seems like a remarkably Schmittian 
description of the role played by the Federal Reserve Board—
and, more particularly, its Chair, Ben Bernanke. Schmitt’s “so-
vereign” is the person who can successfully define something as 
a “crisis” and then basically do whatever he or she thinks neces-
sary to meet the crisis.263 But Ben Bernanke is not a sovereign 
dictator. He is a commissarial, or constitutional, dictator. He 
enjoys his power courtesy of congressional statute, the residue 
of a previous Administration’s demand for discretionary power 
in the face of a perceived emergency.  
What is perhaps most important about this story is that 
the discretion rests not with the President but with Ben Ber-
nanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve. In this economic cri-
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sis, George W. Bush did not play the role of “the decider.”264 A 
modern political system facing complicated problems that call 
for substantial expertise may require a number of de facto dic-
tators in crisis situations, precisely because the nature of crises 
can be different.265 We call this development distributed dicta-
torship. Although Congress has given Bernanke, in his capacity 
as head of the Federal Reserve Board, discretion to save the na-
tion’s financial industries, he obviously has no authority to de-
tain people suspected of swine flu. That power rests, in large 
part, in the head of the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention in Atlanta, the Surgeon General of the United States, 
and the Department of Health and Human Services. And none 
of these officials has the power to decide whose e-mails to gath-
er. That power rests in the control of yet another constitutional 
dictator, the director of the National Security Agency or anoth-
er intelligence service. 
Here, as in many other cases, the administrative state 
overthrows our conventional notions of a dictator as a single 
strongman at the top who makes key decisions. Instead, we in-
creasingly see delegation to different constitutional dictators 
with different areas of expertise. The modern administrative 
state features a distributed dictatorship, spreading unreviewa-
ble power among a variety of different agencies, czars, and bu-
reaucrats. In the economic crisis of 2008, President Bush was 
largely a figurehead, whether by choice or by circumstance.266 
The Treasury Secretary and the Chairman of the Federal Re-
serve made the key executive decisions.267 
The constitutional theory of the unitary executive, which 
was much touted during the Reagan Administration, is de-
signed to preserve the President’s formal ability to control, 
oversee, and hold accountable all members of the executive 
 
 264. Cf. Elisabeth Bumiller, Not ‘the Decider,’ but Stirring Anxiety, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2006, at A17 (quoting President George W. Bush as stating 
“I’m the decider, and I decide what’s best”). 
 265. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 37 (providing that Parliament 
may declare a state of emergency when “the life of the nation is threatened by 
war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public 
emergency”). Threats to “the life of the nation” may be caused by distinctly dif-
ferent events and may require distinctly different skills to manage. 
 266. See, e.g., WESSEL, supra note 231, at 196 (“Bush did as he did at al-
most every stage of the Great Panic: he delegated.”).  
 267. Id. (“More than a year into a financial panic that had become the big-
gest threat to American prosperity in a generation, the president of the United 
States remained largely a spectator as the Treasury secretary and Fed chair-
man he had appointed made and executed the plays.”).  
  
1842 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:1789 
 
branch.268 It is no accident that this theory began to gain cur-
rency after the work of the executive branch became so varie-
gated and specialized, and following the most dramatic ideolog-
ical shift in the White House since Roosevelt’s replacement of 
Hoover in 1933.269 President Reagan’s lawyers were attracted 
to the theory of the unitary executive precisely because they 
felt, perhaps for good reason, that the administrative state was 
beyond their control, particularly with regard to civil service 
protected holdovers from previous administrations might not 
have shared the Reaganites’ ideological preferences.270 Moreo-
ver, Stephen Skowronek has pointed out that the unitary ex-
ecutive theory arose during a period when the President and 
Congress were usually controlled by opposite parties: defenders 
of a strong presidency viewed increased control over the bur-
eaucracy as the best way to promote their policy goals without 
interference from opponents of the President.271 The theory of 
the unitary executive is a convenient fiction offered by lawyers 
to allow presidents to consolidate power within increasingly 
complex administrations that necessarily feature multiple cen-
ters of power and sources of authority. Asserting that the Pres-
ident actually has control over the entire Administration is a 
bit like the courtiers of King Canute who tried to flatter him by 
claiming that he could direct even the progress of the ocean’s 
tides.272 King Canute, on the other hand, had no such delusions 
of grandeur.273  
 
 268. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (re-
viewing the history of the unitary executive theory); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judi-
ciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165–66 (1992).  
 269. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: 
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 411 (1997) (“Whatever the 
limits of the Reagan reconstruction, no president in recent times has so radi-
cally altered the terms in which prior governmental commitments are now 
dealt with or the conditions under which previously established interests are 
served.”).  
 270. Cf. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 268, at 374 (noting Reagan’s efforts 
to wield greater control over the various parts of the executive branch). 
 271. See Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presiden-
tial Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 2070, 2073 (2009).  
 272. See Barrie Markham Rhodes, From Viking Warrior to English King—
Canute (Knud) the Great, VIKING NETWORK, Nov. 8, 2000, http://www.viking 
.no/e/people/e-knud.htm. 
 273. See id. 
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In practice, of course, the President cannot effectively con-
trol many of the discretionary decisions made by lower level of-
ficials.274 And in other circumstances, independent federal 
agencies and civil service protections prevent the President 
from immediately firing people who exercise discretion.275 The 
theory—or rather, the theoretical fiction—of the unitary execu-
tive tries to deal with these realities in three ways. First, it de-
nies that some of these realities exist.276 Second, it uses the 
theory to try to consolidate power and avoid oversight in cer-
tain circumstances.277 Third, when pressed, it claims that still 
other features—like independent agencies—are unconstitu-
tional.278 Behind the rhetoric of the unitary executive, however, 
is the reality of increasingly disaggregated forms of power and 
expertise in the modern executive branch. In the modern ad-
ministrative state, unilateral decisionmaking power is distri-
buted as often as it is concentrated in a single individual.  
III.  GOVERNING THROUGH EMERGENCY   
A. THE PRESIDENT’S ABILITY TO CREATE REALITY 
The characteristic pattern of constitutional dictatorship 
described in this Article has continued even after George W. 
Bush left office. Barack Obama, like George W. Bush before 
him, began his presidency by taking advantage of the opportun-
ities presented by emergency; he pushed for a sizeable econom-
ic stimulus package to deal with an economic crisis.279 Or, more 
correctly, he took advantage of the President’s ability to define 
the situation before him as an emergency and assert that bold, 
decisive action was necessary to avert the particular sort of cri-
sis that he claimed the nation faced. This feature of the charac-
teristic pattern—the President’s characterization of the situa-
tion—is quite important.280 As President Obama’s incoming 
Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, famously put it: “[y]ou never 
 
 274. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 268, at 376. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See Skowronek, supra note 271, at 2095. 
 277. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 268, at 376. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See David Jackson & Mimi Hall, Obama Stimulus Bill ‘on Track’ to 
Pass, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
washington/2009-01-23-obama-friday_N.htm. 
 280. See Stephen M. Griffin, The Bush Presidency and Theories of Consti-
tutional Change 14 (Feb. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor). 
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want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is 
an opportunity to do things you think you could not do be-
fore.”281 
In the Roman dictatorship, the Senate declared a state of 
emergency, which authorized the two consuls to choose a dicta-
tor.282 The dictator could not be held accountable for his actions 
during the dictatorship and he enjoyed virtually unlimited 
powers for a limited time.283 Noteworthy in the Roman dicta-
torship is the division of labor between the body that declared 
the existence of an emergency and the person who held emer-
gency powers.284 Although the American pattern of presidential 
request for emergency power from Congress may seem similar, 
it is different in two crucial respects. The first is that emergen-
cy powers usually do not evaporate after a limited time, but ra-
ther become part of the basic statutory framework.285 The 
second is that the President, because of his preeminent political 
position, has a unique power in the American system of gov-
ernment to define the nature of political reality.286 This makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to refute his analysis 
of the situation as involving an emergency; and this, in turn, 
greatly reduces Congress’s ability to refuse his requests for ad-
ditional authority. 
The 9/11 attacks, for example, allowed George W. Bush to 
define the situation before the nation in existential terms as a 
war of national survival (rather than as part of a continuing 
problem of terrorist attacks) and to define himself as a war 
president, thus purporting to activate all of the powers that a 
president enjoys in time of war.287 His greatest achievement 
 
 281. Mara Liasson: On Obama’s Team, Ex-Clinton Staffers Get Do-Over, 
(NPR radio broadcast Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=98593976. 
 282. See ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 20. 
 283. See id. at 23. Among the limitations were that the Senate would speci-
fy the purpose of the dictatorship and that the dictator could not control the 
treasury, but had to rely on money that the Senate appropriated. See id. at 24. 
 284. See id. at 20. 
 285. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 286. For a scholarly analysis of the President’s power to shape public opin-
ion through rhetoric, see JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 
(1987). 
 287. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address After Terrorist Attacks 
on New York and Washington (Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://archives 
.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/index.html (asserting that “our way 
of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly 
terrorist acts”); President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Con-
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was convincing Americans to believe in the existence of a war 
on terror, a war with no defined battlefield and no defined 
enemy. Since both of these elements were lacking, the Presi-
dent could define the war as taking place literally everywhere, 
including within the United States.288 And since the enemy was 
a shadowy network of loosely connected terrorist organizations, 
the President could plausibly assert (or imply) that almost any 
country and any (foreign) organization was connected to Al 
Qaeda or contained Al Qaeda operatives.289 Having framed the 
situation as an existential crisis, Bush insisted that he needed 
vast powers to detain, interrogate, and make war;290 he pointed 
to Iraq and insisted that it was a continuation of the war 
against Al Qaeda and that invasion was necessary to keep the 
country safe from nuclear weapons.291 Thus armed, the Presi-
dent’s choice of tactics (secret domestic surveillance, detention 
without habeas corpus, and torture) and his choice of targets 
(Iraq)292 reflected his structuring of the situation, and thus of 
his own powers. The President presented the situation to the 
country as an all-out war against the United States; the coun-
try would respond to this existential threat with courage and 
with determination, led by a commander-in-chief over affairs 
both foreign and domestic.293 
In like fashion, President Obama repeatedly portrayed the 
economic meltdown of fall 2008 as the greatest economic crisis 
since the Great Depression,294 and the theme of crisis appeared 
prominently in his inaugural address:  
 
gress (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen 
.bush.transcript/ (“This is not, however, just America’s fight. . . . This is the 
fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.”). 
 288. See President George W. Bush, Speech in Atlanta at the Georgia 
World Congress Center in Atlanta (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://archives 
.cnn.com/2001/US/11/08/rec.bush.transcript/ (“This is a different war from any 
our nation has ever faced, a war on many fronts, against terrorists who oper-
ate in more than 60 different countries. And this is a war that must be fought 
not only overseas, but also here at home.”). 
 289. See id. 
 290. See President George W. Bush, Historical Analogies for the War on 
Terror: Address at the Heritage Foundation (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http:// 
www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.01.07.html. 
 291. See id. 
 292. See id. 
 293. See Griffin, supra note 280, at 46–47. 
 294. See, e.g., Barack Obama, The Action Americans Need, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 5, 2010, at A17; President Barack Obama, Weekly Address (Feb. 7, 2009), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=85738; Presi-
dent Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President (Feb. 9, 2009), available 
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That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. Our Nation 
is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our 
economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibil-
ity on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard 
choices and prepare the Nation for a new age. Homes have been lost, 
jobs shed, businesses shuttered. Our health care is too costly. Our 
schools fail too many. And each day brings further evidence that the 
ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our pla-
net.295 
The more severe the crisis, the greater the need for bold, 
decisive action, and the greater the need for the country to rally 
around its leader, to whom the public looks to resolve the crisis. 
Even so, it is also clear, as we travel further into Obama’s pres-
idency, that all of the veto points that hinder domestic change 
remain alive and well, and it is still an open question how 
much “change we can believe in”296 President Obama will be 
able to produce during his tenure in office. What is remarkable 
about the first year of Obama’s presidency is that, following the 
successful passage of the stimulus plan, he has largely avoided 
the rhetoric of crisis and emergency with respect to the signa-
ture issues of health care and the environment. As one might 
expect, this choice has had costs: because Obama has been un-
able or unwilling to portray these issues with the same sense of 
existential urgency as George W. Bush, his opponents (as well 
as Senators in his own party) have been strategically better-
equipped to delay and hinder his domestic agenda. 
At the same time, like other Presidents before him, Obama 
seems to enjoy relatively greater freedom of action in foreign 
affairs. Thus, Obama recently decided that the United States 
would continue and even escalate its commitment in Afghanis-
tan.297 Indeed, in August 2009 he told the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars that the Afghanistan war, begun over eight years ago for 
somewhat different reasons—to retaliate against the then-
Taliban government for harboring those who planned the 9/11 
terrorist attacks—was “not a war of choice [but] a war of neces-
 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/PressConferencebythePresident; 
Posting of Amanda Scott to Organizing for America, http://my.barackobama 
.com/page/community/post/amandascott/gGglq4 (Oct. 22, 2008, 13:19 EST). 
 295. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/. 
 296. See BARACK OBAMA, CHANGE WE CAN BELIEVE IN: BARACK OBAMA’S 
PLAN TO RENEW AMERICA’S PROMISE 26 (2008). 
 297. President Barack Obama, Address at the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
Convention in Phoenix, Arizona (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www 
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=86545. 
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sity.”298 In doing so, he took ownership of a war begun by 
George W. Bush (and soon pushed into the background by 
another claimed “war of necessity” in Iraq). Perhaps more im-
portant, by adopting the same kind of crisis rhetoric associated 
with his predecessor, Obama clearly hoped to seize control of 
the public’s imagination and make it harder for those who see 
the war as a dangerous gamble299 to mount an effective political 
opposition. 
One’s view about the legitimacy of a particular use of the 
presidential politics of emergency depends on one’s belief about 
whether presidents have accurately described the nature and 
the scope of the situation before the country. If they have, of 
course, their solution, tailored to that description, makes cor-
respondingly more sense, and so does following their leader-
ship. If there really is an emergency along the lines described 
by the President, then of course, it is very different than if 
there is no emergency, or if it is not as severe as the President 
says it is, or if the nature of the problem is different than the 
President describes, for then the President’s solutions are the 
wrong solutions, and they will lead the country in the wrong 
direction. 
Here we do not focus on who is right or who is wrong in 
their assessments of the situation the country faces. Instead, 
we wish to focus on what Bush, Obama, and other modern 
Presidents share—the way in which the modern President uses 
the formulation and articulation of crisis and emergency to 
take control of the political agenda, shape the nation’s political 
imagination, and make resistance seem, at least in the short 
run, parochial, narrow-minded, and even futile. 
Both Bush and Obama’s presidencies offer examples of gov-
erning through emergency: Presidents seek to gain popular 
support for a political program (and their Administration gen-
erally) through describing reality as involving emergency and 
describing the program in terms of how it deals with the emer-
gency so described. What the President seeks to do, he seeks to 
do because of the emergency; what he has done has been justi-
fied because the emergency demands it.  
 
 298. See id. 
 299. See, e.g., Rory Stewart, The Irresistible Illusion, LONDON REV. OF 
BOOKS, July 9, 2009, at 3, available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/rory 
-stewart/the-irresistible-illusion (“[Obama’s language] misleads us in several 
respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerat-
ing our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obliga-
tions and power, and confusing our goals.”). 
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We emphasize that governing through emergency is not 
the same thing as constitutional dictatorship. The former is a 
political strategy of characterizing a situation to gain political 
support and realize political reforms; the latter is a set of pow-
ers enjoyed by particular persons in the government. One can 
govern through emergency without enjoying the powers of a 
constitutional dictator, and one can enjoy those powers without 
governing through emergency. When the President calls upon 
the country to meet an emergency, he may not seek programs 
that give him greater unreviewable discretion, even if they in-
crease the powers of government generally. For example, much 
of what Barack Obama has sought domestically is new gov-
ernment spending and new government programs that will 
have various oversight mechanisms and legal restrictions.300 
Nevertheless, the politics of emergency and the techniques of 
constitutional dictatorship are often connected. That is because 
historically the politics of emergency has been a major source of 
the cumulative congressional authorizations that bestow dicta-
torial powers. The politics of emergency is a time-tested way for 
presidents to request and obtain the powers of constitutional 
dictatorship in a particular area of concern. The more often 
that presidents turn to the politics of emergency, the more like-
ly it is that both Congress and the President will expand the 
scope of discretionary emergency powers. 
B. PRESIDENTIAL PONZI SCHEMES 
The danger of presidential government by emergency is 
that the President needs to convert the felt sense of crisis into a 
durable advantage for the President and, by extension, his par-
ty, in a relatively short span of time. But this may not be possi-
ble if the public tires of crisis, its attention wanders, or life 
seems to have returned to normal. When the sense of crisis ab-
ates, so too may the President’s power of initiative and his abil-
ity to control the political agenda. As a result, leaders who gov-
ern by emergency have to find new ways of stoking the public’s 
sense of urgency to maintain their mandate for change.301 Ei-
 
 300. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, Bailout Plan: $2.5 
Trillion and a Strong U.S. Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A1 (noting that 
the government bailout plan will have more “transparency and oversight” than 
the Troubled Assets Relief Program). 
 301. Cf. PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE & 
ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTION ACTION 71 (2002) (“Presidents clearly have 
been more than willing to declare emergencies in order to justify their action, 
and the temptation to do so can be overwhelming.”).  
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ther they must find new aspects of the current emergency on 
which to focus the public’s attention, or they must find new 
emergencies and new crises to replace the old ones. This is the 
political equivalent of a Ponzi scheme, in which a president 
substitutes one crisis for another to maintain a grip on the pub-
lic’s attention and support. Not surprisingly, organizing one’s 
leadership in this way may descend into fear mongering and 
demagoguery. Moreover, it is an exceedingly dangerous game to 
play. For if the President cannot maintain the politics of emer-
gency, he will lose support when the public’s attention turns to 
other, more mundane matters, or, even worse, the public will 
turn on him. (Conversely, the President’s opponents will point 
to other emergencies—as they characterize them—that the 
President has not addressed, in an attempt to make him ap-
pear incompetent and out of touch.) One reason the Bush Ad-
ministration failed in its ambitions to build a new, long-term 
Republican majority was that it lost the ability to maintain the 
public’s focus on the threats that it claimed faced the nation. It 
lost the public’s attention partly because of its success in pre-
venting subsequent terrorist attacks, partly through its incom-
petence in dealing with other foreign policy (Iraq) and domestic 
problems (Hurricane Katrina), and partly because other issues, 
like the economy, came to rival the “war on terror” as the focus 
of public concern. 
This last point is worth emphasizing: even if the President 
has a first-mover advantage to redefine the political situation 
temporarily to his advantage, he cannot do so indefinitely. Re-
ality (and a resurgence of political opposition) will continually 
intrude on the Administration’s plans. Political opponents will 
deny the President’s claims about reality and assert that they 
understand the real emergencies the nation faces.302 At some 
point presidents must adjust to the responses to their actions, 
 
 302. During Bush’s presidency, for example, Democrats attacked Bush’s 
lack of attention to Katrina, health care, and the economy; during the first 
year of Obama’s presidency, Republicans have attacked Obama’s inattention 
to terrorism, the growth of government and deficit spending. Compare David 
Firestone, Democrats Pulling Together United Front Against G.O.P., N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at A19 (noting Democrats’ criticisms of President Bush’s 
domestic policies for lacking adequate attention to medical and social needs 
while threatening the economy), with Carl Hulse & David M. Herxzenhorn, 
Seeking Cudgel, Republicans Return to National Security Issue, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 2009, at A12 (noting Republican criticism of President Obama’s terror-
ism policy), and David M. Herxzenhorn, Senate Clears Spending After Frac-
tious Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A19 (noting Republican criticism of 
President Obama’s government spending policy). 
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and to realities that they have not anticipated. Bush and his 
advisors did not do this successfully, or they delayed too long to 
make adjustments. The most obvious example is waiting until 
after the disastrous elections of 2006 to fire Donald Rumsfeld 
as Secretary of Defense and begin the counterinsurgency strat-
egy misleadingly known as the “surge.”303 If the members of the 
Bush Administration had been more flexible and less ideologi-
cally blinkered,304 they might well have achieved a new politi-
cal majority that would last for decades. Because they did not, 
they created an opportunity for Barack Obama to construct 
such a majority. 
The dangers of the politics of emergency are threefold. 
First, it leads presidents to misdescribe reality so that they can 
achieve efficacy. Bush’s announcement of a global war on terror 
and his stoking of fears of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq 
to justify a war of necessity there wasted blood and treasure 
and diverted attention and resources from what might have 
been more effective counterterrorism policies. The second dan-
ger is that because the politics of emergency works, at least for 
a time, it is both seductive and addictive. If the President’s pol-
icies fail, he may be tempted to find yet another emergency or 
crisis to give him momentum. This creates a presidential Ponzi 
scheme: the President and his supporters repeatedly use emer-
gency rhetoric to shore up public support or distract attention 
from failed policies. Repeated failures, however, eventually 
create growing problems, not only for the sitting President but 
also for his successors, who find that they too must adopt the 
politics of emergency to govern effectively, and the cycle con-
tinues. The third danger, noted before, is that the politics of 
emergency has historically been the best way for presidents to 
obtain new powers from Congress and pocket them for future 
use, accelerating the forms and practices of presidential dicta-
torship.305 
Like President Bush before him, President Obama may 
well be drawn to the politics of emergency if things do not go 
 
 303. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jim Rutenberg, Rumsfeld Resigns; Bush 
Vows to Work with Majority, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A1. 
 304. Vice President Dick Cheney’s powerful influence, especially in Bush’s 
first term, may have contributed to the Administration’s inflexibility. See gen-
erally BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER 37, 390 (2008) (arguing that Vice President 
Cheney’s truculence, personal loyalty to Donald Rumsfeld, and visible con-
tempt for the views of anyone outside a narrow band of Administration insid-
ers probably caused the Administration significant harm). 
 305. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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well, or perhaps to ensure that they do. Like Bush, he will be 
tempted to define the situation as one of crisis to make dissent 
appear feckless, selfish, out of touch with reality, or irrelevant. 
Like Bush, and like other leaders before him, Obama might 
even be tempted to buy himself a little more time by exaggerat-
ing the scope of the crisis or by replacing one crisis with anoth-
er; but, also like Bush, he cannot do this indefinitely. That 
would require consistently making the situation appear worse 
than it already is, continually raising the stakes of politics—
and that is a very dangerous game. Instead, a President’s most 
daunting task, once he invokes the politics of emergency, is to 
solve the problem he poses in a way that makes the nation 
grateful to him and his party and durably changes the struc-
ture and assumptions of politics. This is what Lincoln and Roo-
sevelt did, and to lesser extent, what Reagan did. It is what 
Bush tried, but ultimately failed, to do. He changed some as-
sumptions of politics, to be sure, but not always in the ways he 
had hoped. Bush used the politics of emergency inartfully, and 
Obama and future presidents must learn from his example. 
Just as we should be concerned about the proliferation of 
features of constitutional dictatorship in the American political 
system, we should also be concerned about the normalization of 
the politics of emergency. As noted above, the two are not iden-
tical, but they can reinforce each other. Increasingly, presidents 
may find that governing through emergency is not an excep-
tional gambit but standard operating procedure. And because 
this politics is so dangerous, risking demagoguery, political 
failure, or both, normalizing it is not a healthy way to run a re-
public. Both Bush and Obama have relied on the politics of 
emergency at the beginning of their respective presidencies. It 
is an interesting and troubling question whether this style of 
politics will increasingly become the modus operandi of American 
presidents in the future. 
C. OUR SCHIZOPHRENIC PRESIDENCY 
So far, we have discussed Congress’s grant of emergency 
powers to the President. But the other side of the equation is 
the relationship between the modern presidency and public 
opinion. 
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Almost a century ago, Max Weber offered a dark portrait of 
the likely evolution of parliamentary democracies over time.306 
Viewing matters from the perspective of the early twentieth 
century, he foresaw an almost inevitable slide toward Caesar-
ism: a plebiscitarian dictatorship in which rulers claim authority 
through acclamation by the people and then proceed to rule 
with little oversight from the democratic process.307 In Weber’s 
account, the legislature becomes increasingly impotent, irrele-
vant, or both. More and more government functions are concen-
trated in the executive. The executive, in turn, gains authority 
from charismatic appeals to the people for the right to rule.308 
Gerhard Casper forcefully drew on Weber’s analysis in a 2006 
analysis of the contemporary American presidency, which fo-
cused on—but was not limited to—the example of the Bush 
presidency.309 One could find a complementary analysis in the 
work of another great Weimar Era theorist of emergency and 
executive power, Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s support for Hitler’s 
rise to power in 1933 was due in part to his deep skepticism of 
parliamentary democracy and his belief that a strong and cha-
rismatic authority figure was needed to break through the po-
litical paralysis generated by the Weimar Constitution.310 
Although each of us supported Obama’s candidacy, it was 
obvious to us that the 2008 presidential election fit this worri-
some plebiscitary pattern: opposed candidates offered highly 
personal and charismatic appeals to the electorate for the right 
to rule. Indeed, the Obama campaign strongly centered on the 
person and image of Barack Obama as a symbol of Americans’ 
hopes for change, even if the precise contours of that change 
were only vaguely defined.311 Sarah Palin’s meteoric rise was 
based on her ability to get large masses of people to identify 
with her personally, as well as her formidable skills as a char-
ismatic populist who claimed to stand up for the ordinary indi-
 
 306. Max Weber, Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany 
(1917), reprinted in 2 MAX WEBER: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1381, 1451–59 
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).  
 307. See id. 
 308. See id. 
 309. See Gerhard Casper, Lecture at the John W. Kluge Center at the Li-
brary of Congress: Caesarism in Democratic Politics—Reflections on Max We-
ber (Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032647. 
 310. See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 34, at 39, 106.  
 311. See Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., From the Gut, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 
2008, at A25 (“But Obama got where he is today by defining himself as the 
agent of change and by defining change as the issue in this election.”). 
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vidual against the sneers and disrespect of unspecified urban 
populations and Washington elites.312 Palin’s mastery of the 
populist art bordered on the demagogic, and we well under-
stand why Obama’s opponents, no doubt taken aback by the 
enormous crowds and enthusiasm he regularly commanded,313 
repeatedly sought to pin a similar label on him. Even John 
McCain, perhaps the least charismatic of the bunch, argued 
that “Washington is broken,” and that McCain was the person 
who could fix it.314 The need for an inspiring figure, freed from 
the old politics, who would lead the country toward transforma-
tive change was a theme of both parties’ campaigns.315 
The tendencies Weber identified toward an increasingly ple-
biscitarian democracy with a powerful executive and a weakened 
legislature well describe aspects of the contemporary American 
constitutional system. Congress’s major functions now seem to 
be twofold. The first is to hold up significant domestic reforms 
because of bicameralism, the Senate’s byzantine supermajority 
rules, and the influence of powerful lobbying groups and cam-
paign contributions by concentrated interests.316 Congress’s 
second major function these days is giving presidents new 
emergency powers, especially to meet threats to national secu-
 
 312. See David Carr, Drawing a Bead on the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2008, at C1 (describing Palin’s appeal as “the kind of woman you could tell 
your troubles to and she’d give you a hug” (quoting Bonnie Fuller)). 
 313. See Mark Leibovich, At Rallies of Faithful, Contrasts in Red and Blue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A1 (describing Barack Obama’s crowds as “the 
biggest and the loudest,” followed by Sarah Palin’s crowds). 
 314. See Michael Falcone, McCain’s Break with Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2008, at A17. 
 315. Compare id. (describing McCain’s advertisement, in which he states 
that the United States is “worse off than [it] was four years ago” and describes 
himself as “the original maverick”), with Friedman, supra note 311 (noting 
that Obama defined the primary issue in the election as “change”).  
For a more realistic, institutionally oriented take on why the American 
political system is broken, see LEVINSON, supra note 113, at 9 (attributing “the 
defects of our polity” to the inadequacy of the Constitution) and THOMAS E. 
MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS 
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK, at x–xi (2006) (listing 
current practices within Congress that have caused past members of Congress 
to “barely recognize the House or Senate”), for some reasons why our system of 
government actually is broken. 
 316. This aspect of our political system leads sober observers to suggest 
that the United States may be verging on the precipice of “ungovernability.” 
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Pass the Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A35 
(“Demand a change in Senate rules that, combined with the Republican strat-
egy of total obstructionism, are in the process of making America ungover-
nable.”).  
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rity. When added to Congress’s limited and relatively ineffec-
tive oversight, it is little wonder that the legislature is the least 
respected branch of the federal government.317 It is hard to 
view this as a healthy development in a constitution founded on 
representative democracy. 
There has always been an asymmetry between a single 
President and a multimember two-house legislature in their re-
spective abilities to capture the public’s imagination and sup-
port. If anything, this asymmetry has become even more pro-
nounced, first, in an age of mass media and later, in the age of 
the Internet. Aided by every possible technological innovation, 
the President, now more than ever, can appeal directly to the 
public. In the twentieth century the mass media were an im-
portant bulwark against presidential overreach, but they have 
become increasingly toothless, in part because of the rise of 
access journalism and in part because professional journalism 
itself is being undermined by the slow and steady destruction of 
its business models. Indeed, the President can now route 
around the traditional mass media and take his case to the 
public directly through the blogosphere or through YouTube.318 
Tight control of message and manipulation of—or routing 
around—mass media is not just the practice of the Bush Ad-
ministration; it will likely be characteristic of every Adminis-
tration from now on. 
As a result, the modern presidency is inevitably a cult of 
personality, and especially so if the President is personally 
charismatic, like Barack Obama. Even if he is less so, his party 
and his handlers assiduously work to create such a cult, as they 
did for George W. Bush. Some of us may be tempted to look 
back at the steady stream of toadying books and articles writ-
ten about President Bush’s genius, moral clarity, and connec-
tion with ordinary Americans as examples of mass delusion.319 
 
 317. See, e.g., RealClearPolitics, Congressional Job Approval, http://www.real 
clearpolitics.com/epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-903.html#news (last 
visited May 6, 2010) (estimating that as of mid-January 2010, polls show that 
only approximately twenty-one to thirty-two percent of the American public 
approve of Congress). 
 318. See, e.g., YouTube: The White House’s Channel, http://www.youtube 
.com/user/whitehouse (last visited May 6, 2010). 
 319. Although Bush was criticized repeatedly during his Administration by 
his liberal critics (and at the end of his second term by many of his fellow con-
servatives), there was an outpouring of encomiums to his character, courage, 
religious faith, and leadership qualities following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A 
sampling of this literature would include: DAVID AIKMAN, A MAN OF FAITH: 
THE SPIRITUAL JOURNEY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2004); DAVID FRUM, THE 
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But if delusion it was, it appeared to work for four or five years; 
at the very least, it helped Bush gain a second term in 2004.
 Presidents now not only set legislative agendas, they also 
are the chief spokespersons for the meaning of America, its 
values, its hopes, and its aspirations. They are not only com-
mander-in-chief, they are also comforter-in-chief (able to “feel 
[our] pain”),320 preacher-in-chief, educator-in-chief, and role 
model-in-chief all rolled into one larger than life persona. The 
American President, unlike most parliamentary leaders, has 
always been both head of government and head of state; in-
creasingly, however, the President embodies the virtues of the 
country, and he becomes a vessel into which are projected the 
hopes of the nation and the virtues of the country (as well as its 
vices). 
At the same time, as noted previously, emergency power, 
the ability to act decisively in a crisis, is not actually concen-
trated in the person of the President. Rather, it is distributed 
among different executive and national security agencies, and 
much of what the government does in emergency situations is 
done in secret. As a result, there is a long-term trend of discon-
nection between the plebiscitarian presidency, with its cult of 
personality and identification of value and action with a single 
individual, and the actual practices of constitutional dictator-
ship, which distribute decisionmaking among many compara-
tively faceless and anonymous institutions and individuals. The 
result of these two opposed elements of the modern American 
presidency is the schizophrenic nature of American constitu-
tional dictatorship. Distributed expertise and secrecy on the in-
side combine with a plebiscitarian cult of personality on the 
outside. As a result, the outward manifestation of American 
power increasingly has little to do with the actual processes of 
government. 
 
RIGHT MAN: THE SURPRISE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2003); RONALD 
KESSLER, A MATTER OF CHARACTER: INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE OF GEORGE W. 
BUSH (2004); STEPHEN MANSFIELD, THE FAITH OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2003); 
RICHARD MINITER, SHADOW WAR: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW BUSH IS WIN-
NING THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); JOHN PODHORETZ, BUSH COUNTRY: HOW 
DUBYA BECAME A GREAT PRESIDENT WHILE DRIVING LIBERALS INSANE (2004); 
BILL SAMMON, MISUNDERESTIMATED: THE PRESIDENT BATTLES TERRORISM, 
JOHN KERRY, AND THE BUSH HATERS (2004); “WE WILL PREVAIL”: PRESIDENT 
GEORGE W. BUSH ON WAR, TERRORISM, AND FREEDOM (Nat’l Review ed., 
2004).  
 320. See, e.g., Harrison Rainie, The New Era of Redemption Politics, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 26, 1994, at 18, 18 (recalling Bill Clinton’s “I feel 
your pain” statement). 
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IV.  DESIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY IN A 
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP   
A. LEGALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
It is very unlikely that the United States will soon disman-
tle its national security apparatus, or its collection of surveil-
lance and data mining practices we call the National Surveil-
lance State, much less a host of emergency measures dealing 
with domestic affairs.321 If so, the question is not whether we 
will have emergency provisions but how the government will 
design them, and what additional checks and balances we can 
put in place to enjoy the benefits of discretion without its dan-
gers. 
The most obvious solution, at least to lawyers, is additional 
legal regulation, or “legalization” of the presidency.322 The War 
Powers Act is a paradigmatic example.323 To prevent the Pres-
ident from doing things we do not like, we create rules that 
make it difficult for him to repeat the activity in the future. We 
might impose either procedural or substantive hurdles to ac-
tion. Take torture as an example: procedural limits would re-
quire special “torture warrants” issued by an independent Ar-
ticle III judge; substantive limits would simply bar these 
methods entirely. One might have thought that we had already 
done this, in the anti-torture statute and in various interna-
tional law obligations;324 the problem, of course, is that the 
President’s lawyers decided to read these substantive require-
 
 321. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance 
State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2008) (“The question is not whether we will 
have a surveillance state in the years to come, but what sort of surveillance 
state we will have.”); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 191, at 533. 
 322. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 189, at 65–66 (noting the increase in le-
galization since World War II). Goldsmith is quite critical of the trend toward 
legalization and argues that Americans should place their primary reliance on 
the capacities for wise judgment by presidents. See Sanford Levinson, Consti-
tutional Dictators, DISSENT, Summer 2009, at 99, 105 (“We ignore the impor-
tance of character, and overestimate the importance of ‘law,’ at our peril, ac-
cording to Goldsmith.”). 
 323. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codi-
fied as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548) (setting various time limits on 
presidential introduction of troops into hostilities without congressional ap-
proval). 
 324. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
(McCain Amendment), 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006); Convention Against Torture 
or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, 
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (entered 
into force June 26, 1987).  
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ments away or declare them unconstitutional as impinging on 
the President’s inherent powers as commander-in-chief.325  
The strategy of legalization has three major problems. The 
first is Jack Goldsmith’s objection that laws are the enemy of 
discretion; increased legalization means increased bureaucracy 
that will hamper the President’s ability to make effective policy 
and take effective action.326 (Since, as we have noted previous-
ly, the President himself is not making many of the judgment 
calls,327 legalization means that lower-level officials will spend 
more time processing paperwork and preparing reports.) The 
second problem with legalization is that it may not actually 
impede bad judgment, but merely give incentives for strained 
or disingenuous legal arguments. Determined lawyers set upon 
a course of finding ways around legal restraints are likely to do 
so, even if the arguments are very poor. In The Federalist No. 
41, James Madison reminds us that “[i]t is in vain to oppose 
Constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is 
worse than in vain; because it plants in the constitution itself 
necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a 
germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions.”328 If this is 
true of people of the very highest character and judgment, it is 
probably even truer of people who are rash, foolish, or venial. 
A third objection to increased legalization is that legaliza-
tion has not been the enemy of discretion, but rather its enab-
ler. When Congress creates new emergency powers for the 
President, it does so through passing new laws.329 When the 
President wants to build out his institutional capacities for 
meeting emergencies, he often does so through issuing new 
regulations and signing new executive orders. Our experience 
of the last eight years of the Bush Administration may cause us 
to think that evasion of law is the great danger of constitution-
al dictatorship. In fact it may be precisely the opposite—the 
proliferation of legal avenues for executive branch officials to 
act, which can then be defended through pointing to various 
laws, regulations, and executive orders that authorize the dis-
cretionary action. 
 
 325. See Bybee Memorandum, supra note 141, at 33–39 (arguing that con-
gressional interference with the President’s power to detain and interrogate 
persons would violate Article II). 
 326. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.  
 327. See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 328. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 295.  
 329. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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Lest we be misunderstood, we do not believe that direct le-
gal restraints on executive decisionmaking are unimportant; 
our point is rather that they are often a limited and incomplete 
solution to the problem, and in some cases may even be coun-
terproductive. A different way of addressing the question is to 
focus on structural mechanisms. The first are political checks, 
the second are methods of accountability after the fact, and the 
third are methods of surveillance and oversight of executive ac-
tion, either before or after the fact. 
B. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES 
As a preliminary matter, we note that parliamentary sys-
tems may have some modest advantages over presidential sys-
tems in heading off the dangers of constitutional dictatorship, if 
only because the Prime Minister has to maintain—and answer 
to—a parliamentary majority coalition. Presidents, by defini-
tion, are able to create their own political base separate from 
the legislature.330 Presidents who combine the attributes of 
head of government with head of state have the additional ad-
vantage of being symbols of the nation itself and are well-suited 
to garner public support and frame social realities. In the Unit-
ed States, for example, the President, who enters public occa-
sions to the playing of “Hail to the Chief” and is surrounded by 
an enormous retinue, increasingly combines the dignitary trap-
pings of monarchy with the media promotions accorded a rock 
star.331  
American Presidents have been plebiscitary leaders for 
some time. In other countries with presidential systems, par-
ticularly in Latin America, charismatic presidents have occa-
sionally allied with the military against the legislature and the 
judiciary, creating the obvious dangers of dictatorial power or 
degeneration into military-controlled governments.332 Never-
theless, Professor José Antonio Cheibub has argued that politi-
 
 330. Cf. GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: 
AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES 83 (1994) (defin-
ing one criterion for the presidential system as “the direct or direct-like popu-
lar election of the head of state”). 
 331. See RICHARD J. ELLIS, PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL: THE JOURNEY FROM 
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 4 (2008) (describing the progres-
sive “monarchization” of presidential travel over our history, which paradoxi-
cally causes the President to be “more visible but less [personally] accessible” 
to any given American citizen).  
 332. See JOSÉ ANTONIO CHEIBUB, PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, 
AND DEMOCRACY 159 (2007). 
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cal scientists have overestimated the potential dangers of pres-
idential as opposed to parliamentary systems.333 Parliamentary 
systems do not necessarily avoid the problems of constitutional 
dictatorship, especially if the Prime Minister is the strong lead-
er at the head of the political party that controls parliament. 
Even if presidential systems present particular dangers, the 
problem of holding strong leaders truly accountable may be 
ubiquitous. 
Turning to the American presidential system, there are 
ways of tinkering with the present Constitution to provide a 
greater measure of accountability. If one especially fears the 
lack of future electoral accountability in a second-term Presi-
dent, for example, then one might consider repealing the Twen-
ty-Second Amendment. Doing so, however, creates a potential 
difficulty in the opposite direction: a charismatic President 
might generate crisis after crisis and keep returning to office. 
There is somewhat less reason, however, to think that many 
presidents would be able to exceed two terms, especially in 
modern times. The modern American presidency seems to chew 
up its occupants in fairly short order. It is possible that this 
may be partly due to the political environment created by the 
Twenty-Second Amendment, but the problem predates the 
1950s. 
Even if the public repealed the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment, the threat of losing a future election would provide only a 
very modest mechanism of accountability. Rejection at the polls 
might occur only years later, by which point the public will 
have moved on to other concerns.334 Moreover, in our current 
electoral college system for selecting presidents, it is quite 
common for a President to be elected with less than an absolute 
majority of the popular vote. (Richard Nixon in 1968, Bill Clin-
ton in 1992 and 1996, and George W. Bush in 2000 are the four 
most recent examples.)335 It is somewhat less frequent for an 
incumbent President to be reelected with less than an absolute 
 
 333. See id. at 3 (arguing that “[p]residentialism can be as stable as par-
liamentarism”). 
 334. Newly reelected presidents might also enjoy a “honeymoon period” 
that shields them from public scrutiny. However, the honeymoon might not 
last long, especially in a president’s second term. (The experiences of George 
W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ronald Reagan are all instructive in their own 
ways.). 
 335. See LEVINSON, supra note 113, at 82–83. 
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majority, but it happened in 1996.336 As a result, there might 
actually be majority disapproval of, and lack of confidence in, 
the President from day one, or shortly thereafter. To be told 
that the public should have to wait another four years to regis-
ter disapproval of the President’s judgment on matters of life 
and death is an inadequate remedy. 
Instead (or in addition), one might support a vote of no-
confidence mechanism that would allow Congress and/or the 
public to remove an American President at any time before the 
next scheduled election.337 The mechanism could involve some 
mix of congressional and popular votes of no-confidence.338 For 
example, perhaps Congress, by a two-thirds vote of all members 
convened as a single body, could vote “no-confidence” and dec-
lare the office of the Presidency vacant.339 One might take a 
page from the German Constitution and Israeli legislation and 
allow such a vote only if that same Congress had already de-
cided on a suitable successor (the so-called constructive vote of 
no-confidence).340 One might go even further and require that 
the successor be from the President’s own political party to 
avoid the specter of a “party coup” that would change the parti-
san character of the government without an intervening elec-
tion. In the alternative, the vote could be followed by the disso-
lution of Congress and public elections for both Congress and 
the presidency (with the “fired” President presumably free to 
make his case to the public). The point is to establish a me-
chanism for the public and Congress to monitor and respond to 
failures of judgment on issues of the greatest importance.341 In 
our present system, by contrast, we must endure disastrous 
 
 336. Bill Clinton received only forty-nine percent of the popular vote, 
though he decisively defeated the Republican candidate, Senator Robert Dole, 
who received forty-one percent. Third-party candidate Ross Perot received 
eight percent. See Richard L. Berke, Clinton Elected to a 2d Term with Solid 
Margins Across U.S.; G.O.P. Keeps Hold on Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 
1996, at A1. 
 337. See LEVINSON, supra note 113, at 119–21 (proposing that a “no confi-
dence” vote replace the current impeachment system).  
 338. See id. at 119–20. 
 339. See id. at 120.  
 340. See DELEGATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRA-
CIES 152, 156 (Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller & Torbjörn Bergman eds., 
2003) (describing the constructive vote of no-confidence and its adoption in 
various countries). Israel’s no-confidence legislation can be found in Basic 
Law: The Government, 2001, S.H. 1780, § 28, available at http://www.knesset 
.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
 341. See LEVINSON, supra note 113, at 120.  
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presidents in office no matter how much damage they may 
cause until the next scheduled election.  
Perhaps equally important, a vote of “no-confidence” would 
have ripple effects throughout the political system that would 
bolster whatever other legal requirements we might wish to 
employ to rein in executive discretion—whether they be con-
gressional oversight mechanisms, reporting and internal audit-
ing requirements, or judicial review of administrative action. 
Congress and the public might reject a President they believe 
has acted too high-handedly no matter what the courts say. 
When the next President takes office, Congress may impose 
new legal or other oversight requirements as a condition of tak-
ing office. At the very least the previous rejection becomes a 
precedent, or a stern warning from Congress, about the sort of 
activities that future presidents may not engage in, and a de-
mand that the next President be more solicitous to Congress.  
The very possibility of a no-confidence vote might have two 
beneficial effects. First, it may give Congress an opportunity to 
pass legislation regulating the President with less fear that the 
new President will veto it. Second, the threat of future no-
confidence motions will make presidents more accountable to 
Congress and less likely to reject oversight mechanisms. Con-
gress can use its advantage to pass oversight and mandatory 
reporting mechanisms and coax later presidents to abide by 
them. (One can hardly imagine George W. Bush following much 
of Dick Cheney’s advice to maximize unilateral executive power 
and ignore requests for oversight and reporting if Bush could 
have faced a vote of “no-confidence.”)  
Thus, the structural reform of no-confidence motions can 
pay dividends for other kinds of reform. For example, presi-
dents may use their veto less often if they fear that Congress’s 
response will be to veto them. Even if votes of no-confidence are 
relatively rare, they would be sufficiently thinkable to serve as 
an effective deterrent. Conversely, votes of no-confidence put 
pressure on Congress to supervise and take responsibility for a 
failing presidency. Constituents will reasonably ask why Con-
gress has allowed an incompetent or corrupt President to re-
main in office. Considerations like these help explain why we 
think that a focus on additional legal regulation by itself may 
be insufficient without attention to larger structural issues. 
Designing structures differently gives legal rules additional 
practical force and effect. 
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One might think even more boldly. Rossiter offers several 
suggestions, based on his overview of the various emergency 
regimes in the five countries he studied. He begins with the 
seemingly obvious point that no “constitutional dictatorship 
should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable 
to the preservation of the state and its constitutional order.”342 
Although unobjectionable in principle, this suggestion is more 
difficult to implement than it first appears. Indeed, everything 
depends on how many forms of executive discretion in the mod-
ern administrative and National Security State we wish to label 
examples of “constitutional dictatorship.” As discussed above, in 
a distributed dictatorship, many different agencies and indi-
viduals have unreviewable discretion, ranging from the head of 
the Federal Reserve to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention.343 
Rossiter’s second suggestion for a well-designed institution 
of constitutional dictatorship is adopted from ancient Rome: 
“the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should 
never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute 
the dictator.”344 As we have seen, the American system flunks 
this essential test. 
To the extent that the American—or any other—constitution 
seemingly allows a President both to declare the existence of an 
emergency and to engage in effectively unreviewable action, it 
has moved far closer to the Schmittian conception of the sove-
reign dictatorship. In fact, as we have seen, this is still possible 
in a commissarial dictatorship, if Congress by statute places 
the right to declare an emergency in the President, and then 
directs the President to take whatever steps he deems appro-
priate. In fact, some American framework statutes have this 
very character, and they take us very close to the Schmittian 
notion that the President decides for himself when to make ex-
ceptions to the rules. However, in this case, the “exception” to 
the normal legal order is part of the normal legal order, be-
cause the power to declare an emergency and to deal with that 
emergency is already built into the framework statute. 
One response, as suggested by the South African Constitu-
tion,345 is to require the legislature to vote to activate the ex-
ecutive’s emergency powers for each particular emergency. The 
 
 342. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 298 (emphasis omitted).  
 343. See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 344. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 299 (emphasis omitted).  
 345. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 37, § 2. 
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American system tends not to choose this path. Instead, it 
creates framework statutes that bestow emergency powers on 
the President or some other executive official, including the 
power to declare an emergency in the first place. So although 
Congress has technically authorized these powers, it may be a 
Congress that sat long ago. Consider the Militia Act of 1795,346 
the Insurrection Act of 1807,347 and the Suppression of Rebel-
lion Act of 1861348 as examples, or the Depression-Era banking 
statutes that empowered Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke in 
2008.349 There is no contemporaneous congressional vote on 
whether an emergency exists; instead the framework statute 
leaves that question to the executive, thus doing an end run 
around the South African (and Roman) model. The closest that 
the American system comes to this model is the declaration of 
war, which activates the President’s war powers, or, following 
World War II (the last declared war), authorizations for the use 
of military force, which, however, never seem to be repealed. 
In any case, there are two additional problems with the 
South African and Roman model, which requires the legislature 
to declare emergencies and activate special powers each time 
the executive requests them. The first arises when we are in-
deed faced with a crisis that demands functionally immediate 
decisionmaking, when there simply is not enough time to gain 
legislative authorization. Although the most obvious examples 
may involve military attack, certain kinds of economic emer-
gencies or health emergencies may also occur suddenly. 
The second problem may be even more basic. It operates 
even when time is not of the essence. In his classic book on the 
American presidency, Clinton Rossiter emphasized that one of 
the six “hats” worn by the President is that of “party leader.”350 
Rick Pildes and Daryl Levinson have argued that legislative 
oversight of an aggressive President, even in a presidential sys-
 
 346. Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and cur-
rent version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006)). 
 347. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 
U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006)). 
 348. Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (current 
version at 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2006)); see also Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 
1871, ch. 22, §§ 3–4, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15 (expired in part in 1873 and current 
version at 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2006)). For a discussion of the Militia Acts, see 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 
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tem, may not operate adequately when the political party the 
President leads also dominates the legislature.351 In fact, it 
may be in the electoral interest of the President’s party to ar-
gue that the country faces a particularly fearful situation, 
which demands the kind of radical action that can be provided 
only by the President and members of his party. The Bush Ad-
ministration’s war on terror is a recent example. 
Pildes and Levinson call for emulating the German prac-
tice and guaranteeing that certain important committees in the 
legislature be placed in the hands of the opposition party, in or-
der to assure some measure of significant oversight.352 Similarly, 
Professor David Fontana has suggested constitutionalizing the 
role of the “party in opposition” in a modern party system.353 
But even these proposals may not respond adequately to the 
possibility that a legislature controlled by the President’s (or 
Prime Minister’s) own party will be more than happy to dele-
gate to the Maximum Leader all sorts of discretionary powers 
associated with constitutional dictatorship. 
Another solution would be to require supermajorities for 
the declaration of emergencies and/or the delegation of emer-
gency powers. To this we might add fixed sunset provisions. 
Bruce Ackerman has suggested escalator clauses, which re-
quire larger and larger majorities to keep emergency powers in 
place after specified time limits.354 This would make dictatorial 
powers increasingly difficult to obtain and to keep. 
Finally, another solution would be to take the decision 
away from the process of ordinary politics completely. The 
model might be the Federal Reserve Board, which is relatively 
independent from the President and Congress, and uses its ex-
pertise to manage the money supply in the public interest. As a 
thought experiment, imagine the creation of an Emergency 
Council whose consent would be required to declare the exis-
tence of a state of emergency that would trigger the exercise of 
extraordinary powers for the executive. In the United States, 
such a Council might consist of some number of officials subject 
to the Senate’s advise and consent powers (perhaps requiring a 
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two-thirds majority, to ensure bipartisan support). It might al-
so include a number of persons who serve ex officio, for exam-
ple, a group of former presidents or retired secretaries of state, 
former heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or former heads of the 
Federal Reserve Board. The members of the group would be 
chosen for their demonstrated probity and good sense in crises 
as well as the public’s general confidence in their judgment. 
Just as we might alter who has the power to declare an 
emergency, we might also consider altering who is authorized 
to respond to it. The President might not be the right person to 
serve as the “constitutional dictator” for every particular kind 
of emergency. If the problem is staving off a threatened mili-
tary invasion, one might prefer someone with demonstrated 
military or diplomatic experience. If, on the other hand, the 
threat is imminent economic collapse, military experience 
would presumably be irrelevant, and someone like the head of 
the Federal Reserve (or another senior economist with wide-
ranging government experience) might be the appropriate per-
son. Rossiter and other admirers of ancient Rome have empha-
sized that the Roman consuls could not select themselves for 
the office of dictator; hence, they had incentives to ensure that 
the person they chose for the office had the character, skills, 
and judgment needed for the particular task. Just as in the 
Roman context, the term of emergency power would be limited. 
This model of delegation to specified experts seems to fly in the 
face of the ideology of the unitary executive. As we have ar-
gued, however, this theory is honored more in the breach than 
in the observance. 
  CONCLUSION   
 There is a great debate in the West about the value of con-
stitutional dictatorships that spans the ages. On one side, we 
have Niccolo Machiavelli and Alexander Hamilton, who argued, 
in Hamilton’s words, that “societies of men” must be “capable 
[of] . . . establishing good government from reflection and 
choice”—that is, deliberate design—rather than generating 
their “political constitutions” from “accident and force.”355 If 
emergency government is necessary, its institutions and the re-
straints upon them should be prepared in advance, to preserve 
and adapt republican government through the many crises that 
nations inevitably face. On the other side, we have Max Weber, 
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who warned against and feared the spread of Caesarism in par-
liamentary democracies, and Carl Schmitt, who welcomed the 
slide toward Caesarism as the natural condition of politics. For 
Schmitt, constitutional (i.e., commissarial) dictatorships were 
but an unstable temporization that delayed the inevitable real-
ity of sovereignty, the power to declare a state of exception. 
We place ourselves firmly on the side of Hamilton and the 
great Florentine statesman of the Discourses. We cannot leave 
the growth of republics to chance and circumstance; one must 
design systems for emergencies in advance to head off problems 
before they occur. That is why all students of constitutionalism, 
including those who study the presidency, must also be stu-
dents of constitutional design. We forget the lessons of Machia-
velli, revived in the past century by Watkins, Rossiter, and 
Friedrich (and, yes, even Carl Schmitt) at our peril. The notion 
of “constitutional dictatorship” may seem at first a contradic-
tion in terms, but it is a reality that every modern democracy 
(like every ancient one) must eventually face. Whatever prob-
lems may attend the design of emergency powers in a constitu-
tional democracy, it would be even worse to slide into patently 
unconstitutional dictatorships; the past century alone has wit-
nessed far too many examples. 
 
 
